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PREPAOE 
In a democratic society, elected representatives 
cannot operate suecesstully in a political vacuum. People 
are swayed by external toroes which oan form opinions and 
intluenee actions. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the extent to which the circumstances in a state inrluenced 
the ideas and actions or four delegates to the Federal 
Convention in 1787. More apeoitioally, bow did the events 
in Massachusetts between 1780 and 1787 arreot the consti­
tutional ideas or four men, Elbridge Gertty, Nathaniel Gorham, 
Rufus King, and Caleb Strong. 
In s l!lenae, this paper attempts to show that there 
were several experiences wbioh motivated the delegates to 
advocate oonstitutional changes in 1787. First, the need 
tor national commercial regulation and a sound t1scal policy 
were factors which set the stage tor their disillusionment 
in the Cont•deration. This paper shows that the delegates 
wel'e espeoislly influenced by what they experienced while 
serving their state in the Continental Congress. Second, 
Shays's rebellion was the crystalizing agent in getting the 
delegates to work tor a chllnge in the national government. 
Once in the Convention, the delegates worked with other large 
state 1ntereets to get tavorable terms in th• new framework 
ot govet"l'Jlftent. Tb.it'd, the most a1gn1t1oaot exp•rienoe 
11 
influencing the delegates was their own stet• constitution. 
This paper attempts to document the similarity between the 
constitutions and the role which the Maasaehusetts delegates 
played in securing the similarities. 
From time to time, I will allude to other influencing 
factors such as the financial holdings ot the menj howeTer, 
I will not be eonoerned with thia aspect ot the problem.* 
I hope to point out that each man reflected his position in 
sooiety--the me�cantile olass--while in deter•nce to the 
point ot •iew that class surely influenced their thinking 
and actions, the amount ot securities which they held had 
relatively little to do with what they thought or did in 
the Con••ntion. Alao the elflment of practical politios 
cannot be laid aaide completely; however, the central theme 
of this work is the extent to which state experiences 
influenced the ideaa ot four men. The paper will show that 
the delegates agreed subat.antially on the nature and the 
form ot the new goTermoent due to these oolleotiTe state 
e..'tperienoes. 
I wish to acknowledge the role my wife play•d in 
typing and proofreading the many drafts ot this paper. I 
doubt the project oould baYe been completed without her 
uotailing assistance. 
§Charles Beard, 
iii 
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CHAPTER I 
When the delegates from twelve states gathered ·in 
Philadelphia 1n the warm summer or 1787, tour representatives 
from the state of Massachusetts pres9nted their credentials 
to the Federal Convention.1 Although these men were not the 
political giants or their state, they had served extensivel7 
1n state and federal polities. The record or their achieve• 
ments in public serY1ee wae not•ble by the time of the 
Constitutional C.on'Yention, and all but the oldest of their 
number would continue as state or national figures throughout 
the Feder•list Era. 
Elbridge Gerr7 was the son of an English emigrant who 
had built up a prosperous mercantile busin-ess in Marblehead, 
Massachusettse After graduating from HarvaPd College at the 
age of eighteen in 1762, Gerry joined his father end elder 
brothers in the West Indies trade• mainly in the exchange 
ot New England fish tor Spanish goods end gold. In May� 1772, 
he was elected ae a representative to the General Court and 
began to take an active part in the local Committee of 
Correspondence. Samuel Adams, a Boston pat�ot, had a great 
influence on h1s 11te, •nd Gerry worked talth.rully and ener­
getically tor the i-evolutiona:ry cause. He was continually 
.....ieeted to the Gen•r•l Court and later to the Provincial 
1Fr•nc1e Dena waa selected but deolined to sel'Te. 
1 
2 
Congress until he was appointed with John Adam.a as a delegate 
to the Second Continental Congress in January, 1776. In 
Congress Gerry was an earl7 advooate ot complete separation 
from Great Britain, and he was present on July 4, 1776, to 
vote in favor of the Declaration or Independence .2 
After serving tour years, Gerry lett Congress in a 
dispute over pi-ofiteering. Although a merchant and a tur• 
nisher of supplies himselt, Gerry disliked protiteering. For 
example, he tried to observe the sohedule ot prioes set up by 
a New England Convention ot 1778. When he attempted to use 
these prices as a basis or the requisition wbioh Congress 
demanded from Massachusetts, Congress i-etused to accept his 
arguments. Gerry took offense and retired to p rivate life 
for the remaining three years ot his elected t•AJJ• Du�ing 
these years he engaged in trade. Marblehead su!'tered from 
the British trade restrictions in the postwar period; yet 
Gerry retired from business in 1786 with a co•fortable fortune 
in government secuttities and western real estate. At the time 
of the Philadelphia Convention, Gerry undoubtedly owned more 
real pi-operty than personal property. He along with twelve 
other delegates held undeveloped lands tor speculation, 
espeeiall1 in the Northwest Territory. Gerr7 also owned 
$50,000 in public securities, but they were wo:rth only one• 
�1.tth tne1r taoe value in l 787. Even so, Gettrry ranked highest 
2samuel E. Morison, 8Elbridg• Gerr7,• D19tt2P1rz ��: . 'Alnel'ioan B!o�r!Pf (New York: Charles SoriSner s ons , ji-2),1!x, 2:. ost or the subsequent material in this 
sketch is derived trom this aoul'ce. Hereafter o1ted as D. A. B. 
ot the forty-ti•• delegates to th• convention who owned 
state or national securities. Yet on the convention tloor 
he declared the interest ($),$00) was so small it would not 
pa7 his taxen.3 
Thl'Oughout his publio career, Gerry's oharaoter was 
marked by integrity and industry, but on public matters he 
trequentl7 obanged his mind. John Adams noted that he had 
"an obstinacy that will risk great things to aeoure small 
onea."4 He did not have• sense ot humor and was always 
suspicious of the •otiYes ot others. His speeches were 
hesitating end laborious. According to William Pierce, a 
writer ot character aketohes of the Federal Convention dele­
gates, he spoke extensively on subjects "without respect to 
elegance or flower ot diction."5 He always extolled the 
virtues ot republioan simplioity. 
After th• ratification of the Constitution, Gerry 
vigorously eupported Hamilton's reports on publio credit 
inoluding the assumption of state debts. jlthough be had 
objected to the Conatitution tor its failure to r•rleot 
Republican ideas, h• favored the creation ot a Bank. He 
3Forrest MacDonald, w! th! Peo
�I
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Cbarl•s Beard, n i n r tatio t one u on 
(New York: Maom an o., 
Beard, Eoopo;ig IpS•£Rretat1og. 
4Moriaon, •Ger17,� D. A. B,, as oit•d trom Works �r 
Job.gt Adams, etl.ted by Charles Francis Adams, (Boston: Li tle, 
Bi-own Inc., 1853) VIII, Sij.9. 
5Max Farrand, R!��rf' gr th• F
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d•r•
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R (N•w Haven: 
Yale Univer�ity Press, 2nd revis on, II, • . ereafter 
cited as Farrand, Records. 
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refused to M.Jn tor re-election and did not enter public life 
again until John Adams appointed him a member or the famous 
"XYZ mission" in 1797. Re returned to America branded e 
"Jacobin" by the Federalists but as a hero to tho Republioana. 
Ger17 ran for governor of Massachusetts several times before 
ha suee9eded to the post in 1810( His first administration 
vss uneventful, but in his second, his attempt to oancel 
Federalist majorities b7 redisti-icting several towns led to the 
torm "ger�ander." In 1812 he was defeated to� the gnvernor­
ship but was put on the Republican ticket headed b7 James 
Madison and wsa elected vice p�esidento He died sixteen 
months later i.n Washington. 
The second d•legate., Nathaniel Gorham, was the son or 
a Charleston packet boat operator and was trained in his early 
age es a mechanic. He became interested in shipping and. 
accumulated some property. His business prospered despite the 
taot that the ravages of the British army in 1775 wipod out 
his personal property. However, during the war he recouped 
his losaee by engaging in reckless privateering and speculation, 
and he grew to be Ve'f.7 wealthy by the conclusion ot the war. 
�om the beginning ot the Revolutiona;twy period, Gorham 
took an active interest in publio atfairs. On the state level 
he served as a member ot the colonial legislature from 1771 to 
1775, �e delegate to the Provincial Cong�ss in 1774-5, and on 
the Board or War from 1778 to 1781. Re helped draw up the 
state eonstituti.on or 1780. H� sei-ved in the legi�lature, 
judici�ry and on the Governor's Couneil under this constitution 
5 
during th@ 1780•so In add1t1on to his etate activities, 
he se!'Ved in Congress iu 1782, 1783� and 1785 to 1787.., In 
the Fedet"al Convention� be presided ove;.r the Committee t."'.tf the 
Whole es he had done in the J>P•vious ;.real' in the Continental 
Congress. He was also a member or his state's convention to 
ratify th� Constitution. 
William Pierce wrote that M� .. Gorham was a man of 
nhigh �eputetion and much in est$em or his countrymen�"6 
Although he did not ha•e much formal edueation, he was a man 
o:t ve?:y good sense<> His sp,eeohes were eloquent and easy to 
understand w�tb nothing fashionable Ot" elegant in his atyle. 
He d,ebated to convince and if he failed� 1 t was not because 
h• oould not be heal"d or se6tlf Gorham had "an a@i-eeable and 
pleasing manner.97 
Alone of the four delegates, Gorham did not enter into 
the national r�eene after the Conventj.on. By the time of bis 
death in 1796� his wealth had been dissipated by unsuccesstul 
business Tentures.. His most elabo:t>ate sch•• involved a vast 
tttact or land ceded to Massachusetts by new York as a ztesult 
of a boundary dispute� Massachusetts sold tbe six million 
acres to Go�ham and Oli•er Pb•lps, a pal"tne� tP<)D'J Windsor, 
Connecticut. The purchase p�ioe was one million dollars in 
th:ree anrmal payments in oonaolidated securi ti•s,, scrip or 
6James T. Adams, "Nathaniel Gorham," D. A. B., IV, 
433. The information in this sketch is· drawn from the 
Jo T. Adams article. 
7Ib1do, 434. Cited trom ParPand, R!OO�ds.1 III9 88. 
6 
Maesschusetts which had a greatly deproei ated Yalue. Emigrants 
began to settlti soon s t"ter the Indian titles were extinguished . 
Ia:rge tracts weN sold during the next two years.· When 
Hamilton's t>unding program caused state eeourities to rise �ram 
)s to 158, th8 partneFs v•nt bankrupt. Even though a lsrge 
amount ot" the property had been sold� Gorham did not have enough 
�•nources to tide him oYer the crisis� Massaohus•ttr. recla imed 
the la nd t"or the displaced Indian�. Gorham suooumbed to th1e 
economic stx-mtn and died .. 8 
The th1�d Massachusetts delagate to the Constitutional 
Convention , Rufus King, ,was the eldest son or a successful 
Maine storeke6per. In 1777 he �nter•d the study ot law in 
Nawbu!'j'port under Theophilus Parosotis , an int"luential leader in 
d•signing.the Massaohusetts Constitution or 1780. After a 
b Piet milita17 service as aide-de-camp to� General Sullivan in 
Rhode Island, King returned to his studies and wae adm1.tted to 
the Mesaaohusetts' bar in 1760.. He was elected delegate to 
the General Court from Newburyport in 1783, 1784, and 1785. 
Between 1784 and 1786, he served as a delegate to the 
Continental CongresEv His most notable achievement was pro­
posing a resolution to exclude slavery from the future 
Noztthwast T��r.!tory, and the resolution was later accepted as 
part of the Ord:1. nanoe ot 1787 v King also urged all states to 
contribute to rederal expenmee in 1786 while he was chairman 
or a committee on finances. Along with James Madison, King . 
8MecDonald, Wt, the Ptoplt, 43·4· 
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wae sent on an unsuccessful mission to plead with Pennsylvania 
to grant Congrese a tive pe!'Oent impost.9 
King's eoonom1e condition improved as he became more 
in•olved in New York society both aooially and politioally. 
He derived �oet ot bl! inaome �om the practice ot law with 
merchant� involved in inte�state and foreign trade. Most of 
his wesl�h was in two to11me ot personal property--bank capital 
and pnbllo securitiee.10 Betoi-e 1791 be held shares equal to 
$3,000 in th� Bank ot New York. Between 1786 and 1788, he 
purchased N&w York securities whose market Talue was half their 
$10,000 face value� The purehaee of these securities was a 
eon�e1'9Ynt1ve inTestment because New York had t'unded its share 
ot th8 nati onal debt by 1786 and was making regular interest 
pa1'ftentso King ranked tenth in ConYention delegates holding 
public securities.11 
In the Constitutional Con•ention, King's personal 
chareet�ri�tic� were nGted by William Pierce in a laudatory 
paNgrsph,� King wa!! a man dietinquished tor bis eloquent 
oratory end parliamentary talents. He had a good claesioal 
snd legs.1 education. His ser'ri.ce in Congress had drawD 
•grest snd de!!ei-Yed applauae."12 In his public speaking 
there was 8aomething peculiarly strong and rich in his 
q 
'Claude M, Fuess, "Rufus King," D. A. B., V, 398. 
'l'h1s sketch 1� drawn t�om infoABation in C .  M. Fuess ' article 
in the D. A. B. 
10MaeDonald, We, the Ptqplt, 87, 90. 
12Farrand, Reoorda, III, 87. 
11 
Ibid., 89. 
8 
expresaion, clear. and convincing in his argument, 1'8pid and 
irresistible at times in his eloquence. � • •  •13 Pierce 
guessed that he might rank among the "luminaries or the 
present Age.n14 In the ratitioation convention in Massachusetts, 
King's tamiliarity with the provisions or th• Constitution and 
his oratory help•d secur• the approval or the state. 
Having mai-ried Ma17 Alaop, the daughter or • wealthy 
New York mercluln'b • King mned to New Yoi-k in 1788. Shot-tl7 
atter his ai-rival, he was chosen as eenator to the new 
national goverment by the llev York legislatul'e. During his 
tenure he became a leading Fed•r•list •nd aided Hanlilton•s 
financial program through the Senat•. Washington Dlflde him 
minister to GPeat Britain in 1796 (upon the urging or Hamilton) 
where he served vi th distinction until l"etiring in 180.3.. In 
the presidential campaigns ot 1804 and 1606, King was the 
Fedel'"&list vioe•preaidential candidate. Upon �•·•leotion to 
the Senate in 1812, he opposed the War or 1812 but sanctioned 
measures tor the defense of the country. In his next term he 
opposed the establisl'Jl!ent or tb.e second Bank ot the United 
States and the admisaioo ot Missouri as a slave state. He 
opposed the Missouri CompPOmise ot 1820 on the grounds that it 
merely prolonged the controversy and postponed its adjustment. 
Ile retired to prri.Yate lite, •n 111 man, in 1824, but upon the 
insietenee of Preaidet>t John Quincy Adama, h• agreed to serve 
as ministep to England, but within • short time after hia 
13Farrand, Reeord§, III, 87a 
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a�rival in London his weakened health forced him to return to 
the United Stflt"e. He di$d within a year, worn out by the 
exhl!uRting demands or public sel"Tiee. 
C•l_,b Strong wes the fourth Ma�saehusetts delegate to 
the Co"�ti.tutionel Convention. Re was the son ot an honorable 
family ot Northampton, Massachusetts.. After gnduating from 
Hat"lar.t' in 1764 with highest honors, he beoa111e a lewye1'.- ot 
some e�in�noe with the help ot Joseph Hawle7, an aged states­
Men in the Connecticut River Valley-. He was elected to the 
General Gour.t in 1776 an.d retumed to Northampton to serve as 
county attor-ney tor twent)"(-tour oonseeutiTe years. Stz-ong was 
� mernbe� of the d�etting committee ot the state oonstitutioo 
ot 17Ao, but he d•elined a seat in th8 Continental Congrees 
and �n�tead became a st&te sena to r  until 1789. He alee de• 
o11ned n poii.�.tion on the state (n.rpreme eouI't because he 
thought his income wa!l too limited to support the expenees ot 
th.et po!1.t1on.15 
Bt�ong enjoyed a steady but mod&st income rrom the 
tees e�rned wn�kin� with weetern �armers. He held public 
seeu�1ties with a taoe value or $11,000 giving him the seventh 
trl.ghe�t rP.nk smong the rorty•tive delagatea wbo owned 
"t� 16 s eeur_ . . l. es. 
In the Federal Convention Strong's participation was 
limited due to the tact that he was called home in August. 
l5John G. Kieran, "Caleb Strong,n D. A. B., IX, J.41.i.. 
Most of the fsots for this sketch were derived from this source . 
l�acDonald, We, the Peopl•, 45, 86» 90� 
10 
Pierce wrote that as a speaker he was feeble and without 
oonfidenoe.17 However, Strong favored a strong union and 
worked in the state ratitying convention with activity. Chosen 
a a  one of the Senators trom his state in 1789, h• was active 
in traming the Judioia17 Aot and urged the adoption or 
Hamilton • s  tinanoial program. He was re-elected in 1793 but 
resigned in 1796 to resume his law practice. Four years 
later the Massachusetts Federalists ran him tor governor. His 
annual re-eleotioo to� the next seven years while Jetteraonian 
elements giaew more popular attests to hia personal popularity. 
Defeated by James Sullivan, a p?'Ominent lawyer, in 1807, he 
ran again in 1812 and won the governorship against Elbridge 
Gerrya During the War ot 1812, Strong represented the anti­
war attitude in his state; yet he prevented disunion by obey­
ing the letter, not the epirit, of tederal obligation. He 
�tused to order the state militia into the federal army. 
He approved legislative action calling tor the Harttord 
Convention; he favored peace with Great Britain, even with 
concessions ot Massachusetts• t1sheries and territory. Strong 
was re-eleoted governor until 1816 when he retired trom public 
service. His eulogy might have read: a conscientious man who 
earetull7 thought out his views. 
The tour Massachusetts delegates had a unique 
comblnation or interlocking experiences while in public service. 
Gerry, Gorham, and King served a total ot twelve years in the 
17Farrand , Records,  III, 88. 
11 
Continental Congress between 1782 and 1788. They served 
concurrent terms averaging four years each; therefore, at 
least two of these men were representing thei� state's 
interests in Congress at the same time. When not serving 
in Congx-ess, they were involved in state politics where they 
had an opportunity to observe their state's reaction to 
national problems. Two of them, Gorham and Strong, pa�tiei­
pated in the writing of their state constitution in 1780 �nth 
John Adams, the New England political theorist. With the 
exception of Gerry, the delegates participated in their state 
convention helping to ratify the Constitution. In the Federal 
Convention, they had to clarity and compare the constitutional 
ideas to the experience ot Massachusetts. From their years 
of colleetive political experiences the delegates were 
representative or the times. Most important, their attitudes 
were intluenoed by state and local conditions. 
l •• 
CHAPTER II 
During the decade between 1778 and 1788, the four 
Massachusetts delegates witnessed their state pass through 
important economic changes within the framework of limited 
political ohange. The economy turned from a oommereial­
agrieultu:ral order to a limited manufacturing state. The 
dislocation or the var caused a decline and readjustment in 
both her domestic and toreign commerce. The financial 
struoture ot the state also changed in the final years of the 
Revolut1.on from a conservative, paper money policy to a more 
strict, hard currency one. At the same time the state consti­
tution or 178o help9d the conservative mercantile elements to 
retain control of state politics. Out or the clash between 
the two trends••& changing economy and a slow changing political 
atructure--came a rebellion which iotluenoed national affairs. 
Most of the J00,000 people of Massachusetts were engaged 
in ag?-ieulture during the 18th eeotur-y. Coming from mainly 
British stook, the people shared oommon traditions and similar 
economic attitudes. During the 1780ts, the eastern counties 
we� the most denael7 populated while the western areas, with 
the exoeption or the Connecticut River Valley, had a �•lative­
ly span• population. One estilllate plaoed 170,000 people along 
the ooast, 90,000 in the oentral counties ot Middlesex and 
12 
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Woroeste�. and 33,000 west ot the Connecticut River.1 Lite 
tor the fal'lller bad been unusually prospei-ous during the war 
years. Thoae farmers who were able to �•is• surplus rood� 
stutra found a ready market during th• Revolution . 'l'he de· 
manda by the colonial army aad the French army in the latter 
part ot the war meant good prioes and, v•'l!Y important , pay­
ment in specie. The war bad taken awa7 laborers from the 
tields so that there waa deoreased pl'Oduction. Townspeople 
oomplained bitterly about th• exorbitant prioes charged by 
the farmera. Simple Indian oorn went from Js a bushel in 
l 777 to £ 3 12s 1 n 1779 . Wi th the evacuation or Freooh troops 
at the end ot the war, a depression gripped the agriculture 
or the state. Not only was there a g�atl7 reduoed local de• 
mend for farm produce, but postwar trade restrictions by 
toreign governmeat1 oloeed th• s ta te ' s moat lucrative grain 
and livestock markets in th• West Indies. Massachusetts 
exports up to 1786 tailed to reach one-fourth th4tir 1774 
tigure. Sagging export markets meant deolini�g prices and 
scarcity ot mone7, and western subsistence farmers were 
hardest bit by the agricultural depreeaion.2 
14 
ETeo though the majority of the population was engaged in 
agriculture, the Revolutionary Wsr had stimulated growth 1n 
limiten m3nutaeturing., Restricted previously by- the regu­
lations or the British govepmnent during th• colonial period, 
the il:'On industr7 develeped mors rapidl7 during the eon£11ct 
to meet the demands. Fouodries were small affairs due to 
limited resou:t?ces and capital. Worcester County led io the 
manufacture of metal goods with the Springrield Armory being 
the most importaDt industi-y. Plymouth and Bristol counties 
contained eixteen touodl"ies, twenty forges, and •even rolling 
and slitting mills. 'l'he leather and ab.oe industry, which also 
had sur:rered undeP British oolonial ,pol107, expanded during 
and after the war in Essex County� Cloth and pap•r manui'sctures, 
salt wo�ks and glass factories, and soap abd oaDdle making w•re 
some or the n•w industries to benef'it b7 the readjustment 0£ 
the state's economy. One historian noted that exoluding the 
prewar indus•riee (shipbuilding, distilleries, apermaoetti 
works), there were 11786 new factories established in 
Massachusetts during the 1780•s. The value of goods for 
export ,was three tim•e that bef'ore the w ar.3 
With the postwar depreasion, the state's traditional 
icdust,rios tnoed sevePfll p�oblems ot readjustment. Ship­
building bad been New Engls�d•s beeio industPy before the 
Revolutions Enoouraged by the Navigation Acts, Massachusetts 
3Dewe7, "Condttion," 358J Maotonaid, w,, 'i; 'e91le, 
186. By Ma cDonal d ' s caloulat1ons, the total •.xpor� or 
1771 •qualled $667,000 and during the 1780•s the estimated 
exports were $4�000,000. 
15 
had produced an average or 125 shipe & year. The war kept 
the demand high because the 8tate governmeDt licensed 1,554 
ships tor p�ivateering and merobant pul'poses. Moat or these 
vessel� were captured, destroyed, or scattered by the British 
tleet. However, after the war shipbuilding iodustr7 was hit 
by a depression. The American shipowners faced both foreign 
competition and a laok ot capital to rebuild wartime losses. 
The loss ot the old carrring trade turtheP aggravated the 
situation. Jefferson said that the British trade restrictions 
bad meant a loss to America ot 600 to 900 vessels trading on 
the high seas. A record ot the number ot veasel8 built in­
dicated the slump in the industry. In 1784, torty-tive vessels 
were built, twelve ot whiob were tor the French Indies con­
tracted by the French government. From 1785 through 1788, the 
Commonwealth's �hipyards averaged only fifteen to twenty keels 
a year. One historian reported th.at only eleven ships were 
started in construction in all New England in 1789, and that 
this represented a loss ot nearly �100,000 a year.4 
Removal or the protective hand ot the British colonial 
policy also atteoted the whaling and tisbing induatriea. The 
whaling industry declined in importance tor several reasons. 
First, there was a tl"emendous loss in manpower and ships 
during the war. Nantucket, the most important whaling port, 
lost 151 ships and 1200 seamen with only twenty-tour whalers 
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�emaining at the end ot the wa�. Although the state 
government passed bounties trying to revive the industry 
in the 17801e, these ef�ol'ts tailed beoauee there was a 
drtHJtte decline in the market tor sperrnaaeti, the main prao• 
duct of the l.fl:i..A le. The domestio ma 1'.'ket had oonverted to the 
us& of cheap ta l low oandles under wartime restrictions and 
did not return to the use ot eper.'maeeti. More important, 
h�we�erj the British market was pra�tioally closed to 
Amerioan whale oil and the old Enclish bounties had been 
teminnted. Mo�over, the British goveMJment levied an 
oppressive duty of £18 3s per ton of Amerioan oil. There• 
fore , whaling was no longer �rofitable beeause the cost or 
investment was hieh , pi-ices we�e low, and markets wer� 
11mited c S 
The cod fishing industry wae able to revive moz-e 
quickly but faced the same px-oblems as the whaling i ndustry--
lack or vo�eels� oapital, and markets. Most fishing veeaels 
were left high and dry while privateering lured the sailors 
to sea durlng the WAt-. At the v.·ar's end, the ships needed 
expenaiv·e �epsire. Convettted schooners, l-thieh C:Jerved as 
coastal ves�e1.s, end merehsntmen needed refitting it they 
wel'e still able to float. In the Peaee ot Paris ot 1783, 
John AdAm's diligent efto!9ts insured the Amerioane the 
right to �ish on the G�and Banks, and this agreement pla7ed 
an i"IJPO�tant role in the industry's recovery, but the best 
market f'o:a.., .'1i�1e1"ican fisi.1 was destroyed when the British placed 
5Nettels, �Atiofi!l �ncm�, 52-J; Dewey, •conditions,• 
362; Morison , Mari !mi storY, j -1. 396. 
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the West Indies oft limits to American goods and ships. The 
French and Spanish Indies could absorb only halt the production 
of the American fisheries. A sohola� has estimated that 
between 1786-1790, New England receipts from cod fishing 
ageraged $464,000 a yea�, a loss of tort7•three percent com­
pared with the 1765-1775. Dialooation in the tishing industry 
meant low incomes and unemployment tor many citizens ot 
Massachusetts.6 
The loss of the lucrative West Indies market was a key 
taotor in creating the postwar depression in Massachusetts. 
The state's coasting trade also declined without access to 
valuable goods from the Indies in exchange tor tobacoo in the 
Southern states� Homemade goods from New England could not 
capture or compete in the Southern market with tinished goods 
from Britaino Yankee merchants looked tor new markets and 
found China, India, and Europe; however, the profitability 
ot these routes grew very slowly. The increased wartime ma�­
kets which resulted trom the alliance with France did not 
survive the peace. How•ver, in 1780, the French and the 
Spanish Indies set up import duties upon Amerioan tieh, salt­
pork, and breed stutfs in an attempt to stimulate the growth 
ot their own merohant marines. Besides losing British ports 
by the British restrictions in 1783j the New England merchants 
had also lost some valuable advantages. Att•r 1784, Algerian 
oorsaira p�e�ed upon American shipping and slowed the 
1 
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Medite�ranean trade considerably. With neit h•r a navy to 
protect them nor .funds to pay tribu·tej Am•rioan shippiog was 
wrecked by the piracy or the narbary Coast. American shipping 
also surrered from diecrim1nat1on by B�itish insuranc e eom­
pan1ea o Britis h and French vess els paid two percent while 
Americans were charged five percent tor the same voyage. 
American merchants had won the rreedom to determine the course 
or their foreign commerce but ended up with rew marketsu Since 
Congress lacked ettective power to promote trade agreements 
and states oould not engage in diplomacy to get commeroiel 
treaties with toreign nations� the Massaohueetts export trade 
slumped badly during the deoade.7 
The import trade ot Massachusetts was exactly opposS.t� 
that of her export trade because the British restrictions on 
the Ame�iean carrying trade prevented a balance or trade. In 
the p�stwer period the British hoped to and did replace the 
French aa suppliers of the Massachusetts' market. Without 
trade re striotione by either the national or the state govern­
ments the American market was swamped by British goods carried 
by British ships. The British merohants extended liberal 
credit terms to the American merchants � Lured by the seeroing1y 
endles s souz-oe ot Bri tieh ol'edi t, merchants ordered more 
finished goods than they could pa1 r.or in exp orts . For 
examp1·e, mel'ohants -purchased three-fourths to four-fifths of 
!9 
their goods on oredit.. In tho spring of 1783, one English 
Bomp8ny extended��150,000 credit to Boston me�ohaots alone� 
Port r�tJo!"da show that between M$y and December o.f 1783 � 
twenty-eight French vessels and twenty-eight English 
vessel� brought in $500,000 wo�th of lu,�uries and ottered 
them on eredit6 But in August, 1784, five London tit-ms 
tailed when Americans could not pay their debts. Although 
British exportstions to AmePioa in five postwar years 
averaged.£1,500,000 less than tive yea�s before the Revolution, 
the whole nation, as well as Massachusetts, suffered a balance 
ot payments deficit. Between 1784-1786, the United States 
imported--.::- 7 ,.500 ,000 of Bri tisb goods and exported to Great 
Britain-£.2,400,000. Her trade deficit averaged ,r:l,260,000 
8 a year oz- totaled.£.5,000,000 for the three :rear period., 
"!"•...,, 
With Massachusetts unable to control her commerce to 
her beoefit, the re8ult was a gold drain which intensified the 
eri t:tcal pi-oblan ot state .finances. Massachusetts h$d a 
unique� hard money system until the conditions of the Revolution 
forced s change to a form ot ou�renoy finance. Although the 
colony had been the first to issue paper inocey to co·ver the 
expenses of a oolonial war in 1691, the English colonial 
government to�oed her ott papero Beoauae ot the plentiful 
amount of specie brought in by the colony's commerce with the 
West Indies, Massachus etts was able to maintain a hard money 
system without too much trouble. But with the Revolutiona:ry 
8Nettctls , National Eoogonl�, 48-9; Morison , Ms:ri time 
Histor:y, 35; MoMas�•�s, Hltio£I o U� � I, 255. 
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war came a tlood of pape� em 1 1 sions from both Continental 
and �tate e ou�ces. When the C�m:aonw•alth'a Provincial' 
Congress rsised an army, the urgeno1 of the situation was 
met by issuing �aper mone7 in the fol"ll ot treasury notes. 
At first these notes were acce pted at par value, but public 
oontidence declined rapidly with the influx ot Continent•l 
notes and those ot neighboring states. Even though pl'intiog 
papsr mon�y was a faTorite method used by ell the governments 
to finance the war, Massaohusetts adhered as muob as possible 
to a conservative , hard mone7 policy . While other states, 
suoh as Virginia printed money with the taee value of 
$128,000,000 in the whole course or the war, Massachusetts 
printed less than $4,000,000. In contrast, the Continental 
Congress printed $241,533,000 to 1779.9 
Whereas the Continental currecc7 was printed in small 
denominations and bore no interest, the Massachusetts ootes 
were purchased mostly b7 =•rcbants es an investment with the 
interest repaid in specie. These state notes never became as 
great a medium or exchange aa the Continental pap•� money� 
During the course or the war, the speoie value or the 
Continental bills depreciated rapidly . Congress, recogoiziog 
that tho old emiss ions were falling below a 40 to l ratio in 
9Arthur N. Holcombe, "Massachusetts and the Federal 
Constitution of 1787," Oraoowea lth His1or1 ot M@ssaghuiott,, 
ed. A. B. Bart, (New Yor a 'l'he §£ate H a'Eo1l Compan7 , 929 , III, 369-370. Hereafter cited as Holoombe, Masaaohusetts." 
Robert East, ft'I'tl• Mas1aobusetts Conservati••s iD the Critical 
Period, " The Era of the American Rt?olutiop, ed. Rioha�d B. 
Morris, (Mew YorfC: Columbia tfn!vers!ty Presa, 1939), 354 .. 
Hereefter o:tted as East, 11Cl'itieal Pe rt od . " Dewey, "Eoonomic' 
Condition s , "  342-3� 
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1780, called upon the states to honor them io tax eollect1ons. 
Yet, Congress went on to ieeue n�w bllls of cpedit not to 
exo•ed one-twentieth the old emissl.on.. Before the old 
emissions went out o1' circulation, Massachusetts accepted 
them as leg&l tender at a much higher rate than the true 
ratio of tha times--150 to 1. With her evaluation of the 
currency being higher tban the suri-ounding state, a large 
volume of the pape� emissions gravitated to the etate and 
staok$d up in the Massaohuaetts treasu19Y. The state govern­
ment hopod that the tederal government would honor the 
oertifioatea at a 40 to l ratio when applied to the state's 
quota. Obviousl7, the state therefore bad an interest in how 
10 the federal debt was redeemed. 
The control of the state's fiscal policy created 
antagonism between the agrarians and the commercials. The 
earliest point of conflict between these groups was over the 
ouPbing or inflation during the war. The depreciation in the 
valu� of the ou�rency created bighsr prioes tor the tarme�. 
Many prices showed a 400 percent 1narease in the period between 
1777 and 178o. A Boston merchant wrote to a correspondent in 
England in 1777 and stated that "though our money bas dep�e­
eiated • a • and though man1 individuals sutter; yet the farmer 
and the bullc or the people gain by the war."11 But the 
10n.wey, "Economic Conditions," 342·46; E. James 
Ferguson, T'' PSwgr oft t.h• Purse (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1 96l , 6 - , � ereafter eited as Ferguson, PQ!Jer �t 
Purse. 
11newey, "Economic Conditions,tt 354. 
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merchants , who were the bankers of the times , wanted to curb 
ronaway infla tion . By January, 1776, the General OouX't passed 
det•iled price lists for commoditie s ,  service s ,  and wages 
reflecting its control by the mercantile interests in an 
attempt to curb inflation . The laws protected the buyers 
ag•inst extorti on . One law stated that any citizen who sold 
merchandise for less apeo1e than the price in paper currency 
would be liable to a 20 tine . The farmer who was the seller 
and not the buyer in moat oases only indirectly benefited from 
this legislation . Tb.e law made paper money par to speoie, 
therefore reet�1ct1ng a natural inflationary trend favored by 
the agrarian debtors . 12 The etate was interested in sound money. 
The p �io• control mov .. ent which atarted on the state 
and local level grew to be regional in scope . In Deoember, 
1776, delegates t�om tour New EnglaDd et•tea mat at Providence� 
Rhode Island, and appl'OYed a schedule tor t1xed wagea aDd 
prices . All tour states enacted this agreement into law and 
sent i t  to Congreas tor approva l .  Congress mildly approved 
and attempted to initiate other iaegional meetings , but all 
the etatee south or Maryland retused the inTitation. Four 
middle states met in 1778 and approved the Provid•noe codes ; 
however, p �ioe control• tailed to work on a national le•el 
because both the state aDd the central governments continued 
to print money at auoh a rapid rtt e that the value o t  all 
currencies got out ot oontrol . Masseohusetts attempted to 
12newey, "Economic Conditions , "  245-6; Ferguson, 
Power of Pur$e, 243 0 
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maintain the price codes until th&y wel'e repealed in 1778 when 
the vast dumping ot foreign paper curi.noy mad• price control 
impos eible . 13 
After failing in their brief experimeot to manipulate 
wages ·and prices, the mercantile interests increased their 
control of the fiaoal policies or the state att• � 1780w In 
both the state and the national government, 1780 was a year or 
oriais. Inflation was rampant thrbughout the country. On 
the national level some people listened less to the O!'ies or 
liberty and instead welco•ed the ••ll tor more · tinanoial 
stability and s�ronger governments . Conservatives gained more 
s .. ts in Congresa and began to reorganize the goTermnent into 
more efficient bul'eaus . The t1nanc1al oonsel"Vativea u pged 
that the powers ot Oongitess be extended to inolud• taxation. 
But Congress had to rely upon requisitions and £o�ign aid 
since the calla tor imposts in 1781 and 1783 loat when one o r  
more of the etates .tailed to approve . 14 
The movement tor .financial stability and protection of 
pi-opert7 manifested 1 tael1' in the poli tioa l atructul'e ot 
Massachusetts with the state constitution of 1780. The 
easte rn commercial interests of the state had oontrolled the 
General Coux-t since the seventeenth century. ninng the 
l)Nettele , N,$1,gal !gonomf • 27; Ferguson, Po�r ot · 
Pur9!, 42-3; Robert . a71or . �t trn MafJ•�Busett� � tbe lr,vo utiop (Providence : Brown veil8lty r•s•.  t� i), 68-9 .  
Hel"eatter cited a• !'a7lor, W11:ttrn Ma:speohu.ae,tp. 
14Fe rguson. Power ot Pu rse , 112-3 . 
Revolutionary movement, they had looked radicsl but were 
actually as oons ervative a s  ever. Also tbe social sys tem 
cha nged little; yet, t he people with.in the ayatem ohanged 
g�eatly. As most ot the !017 m•�cbants and lawyers tled 
with the British troops ,  the vacuum was tilled by the pat�iot 
merohant with .commercial intere1ts still supreme. 'l'b.e 
Constitution ot 1780 ,  written by this Whig a ristooracy, 
embodied theiP contz-ol over state aftairs . 1
5 
It is iz-onio that while the western farmers were 
responsible tor calling tor the Constitution, the ••·stern 
merchsnts were able to determine the outcome. The roya l 
government in Massachusetts had been supplanted in 1774 
when town meetings in conventions granted the Pro-wincial 
Congress the right to rule in the plaoe ot the royal govern­
ment . The state then a s ked the a dvice ot the Beoond 
Continental Congress about a general plan by whioh the state 
might reorgaaiz e .  Congress waa afraid to endorse any polioy 
which might jeopaN!ize a last-ohaDce oonoiliation and so 
it recommended that the state keep its old colonial govern­
mental sti-uctul'e but without the Governor,. Not all citizens 
were happy with thia makeahitt a rrangement. In Berkshire 
County a minority Jcno•-m a s  the Constitutionalists decla red 
that Massachusetts had DO baais of government because the 
people had not created or appx-oved it. The western countiee 
led by the Rever.end 'l'bomaa Allen, leader ot this agrarian 
l5Eli•ba Douglass . Rebel• arut Pfgograts ( Obapel Hill :  
North Carolina Press ,  1955 ) .  
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re.tom m·ovement, called tor a revision based upon the 
natural rights ot man. In U.cember, 1775, a county convention 
at Rockbridge protested the naming of judges and county offi­
cials without the appi-ova l of the residents. The commercial 
interests in the General Court eonced&d haltway in the tall ot 
1776 to the demands of the westerners when the Court a ssumed 
the power to draft a cons titution itself. When the document 
was put to the town meetings in the spring ot 1778 , the 
instMmlent was rejected by a six to one mal'"gin � The towns 
objectttd because it had not been drawn up by a separate 
convention � The Oonst1tut1onalists used rioting to keep the 
county courts closed and to maintain pressure on the provis ional 
government . Bttt taoed with mounting disorder in the west, the 
General Oourt pasaed a resolution asking towna in February, 
1779, to approve the calling ot a convention to write ths 
document, a reter•ndum to� the people to vote o� the proposal, 
and another convention to count the vot•a. This pas sed by a 
two -to -one margin with no dissenting votea in the weste rn 
counties . 16 
The proposed Oonatitution of 1780 was a more 
consezwvative document than the one submitted to the town 
meetings in 1778 because the balance of power favored the 
26 
propartied interests . The basic dra f't or the document was 
dt•awn up by Johl'.1 Adams with the help of James Bowdoio and 
Samuel Admns .. John Adams used this opportunity to incor­
porat� som� ot the political tbeo �ie a whieh he had put 
forw1Jrd in the pamphle t ,  "Thoughts on Government , "  publi shed 
lo 1776. Thi s  pamphlet was to countera ct the rsdical ideas 
or th6 Thomas PaiD• work, ttcommon Sanso . "  The p roposed 
constitution �ontained a separation of branches and a system 
of cheeks and balances . There waa a two-house legislature 
chosen by different electorates based upon inc rea sed pro­
perty qualifications . There was also a s trong exeoutlve 
wi ·th veto power although the veto oould be overridden by the 
legi sla ture . The third branch, the judic1aey, was ·to serve 
on good behavior or life tenure . Adams also included a 
declaration or rights based upon the theo ry of the natural 
rights of man.  The convention accepted the greatest part of 
Adams ' s  work. Nathaniel Gorham , the delegat& from Suffolk 
County, took an active part in the commi ttees which stylized 
and amended various provisions of the 1net:Mlment . Most 
important , he participated in the committee which s et up the 
rules for the eonTention and the comml ttee W1 ioh waa in chal"ge 
ot pr&seoting the draft to the convention . These experiences 
in leadership were carried acl90ss to his role in the federal 
eol'J'Yention . 17 
113-4; Taylor� 
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One section or the Con s t i tution which caused the most 
debate in the convention wgs A rti cle III, not even proposed 
by Adams . Thi s article virtually provided tor the eatablish­
rnent of a s ta te re ligion because towns were to provide tax 
money for a town church . A commi ttee made up of Samuel Adams, 
Caleb Strong , Robert T .  Paine , Theophi lus Pa rson, Timothy 
Da oialson , Rev ,, David Sanford, and Rev. Noah Allen propsed the 
final wo rding to the oonvention . Parsons in his Memoirs re­
ferrsd to the first three as intoleran t ,  devout Calvinists who 
might hnve desired t o  establish Con31"egation'-lism a s  the state 
religi on . Thia was Strong ' s only documented contribution to 
the Con sti tution . I ronica lly , his Mentor, Joseph Hawley, 
would protest against the new Constitution because the Thired 
Article was so intolerant of the Bapti s ts , Quakers, a nd 
18 Methodi s t s .  
When the dratting conven ti on referred the instrument 
to ttie people� towns were to vote by univeral manhood suf• 
trenge on �aeh section eepar9tely and were to state their 
objections . '11he rati fying conven tion raoed s o�e insurmount­
able ob jections to a few elaused and had to m q r. ipulate the 
fic;ures to set the req_uj rAd two -thirds vote on each section . 
Article II, tor insta nce , was six hundred votes short ot the 
required number but it was retained in the constitution. Yet 
1853 ), IX ,  193•200; Journa l o t  the Conventions 
Constitution ot Maasao 
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the taet that there was more opposition regarding religion 
indioated that the real issue of ecnsti tutionality took a 
back seat to a voicing of religious pre judices o  Neve�the le s s ,  
taost parts of the Constitution passed w1 th more than 
suff:i.Gient majorities including . the see ti ons on voting and 
otticeholding qualificationa . 19 
With the eppro•al of the Constitution ot 1780, the 
wealthy interests aoliditied their control or state politics � 
1'be new eharter �ould not be amended for fifteen years and 
established p roperty qualifications higher than in the oolonial 
pel'iod. The mercantile intel'ests had used a system of diYide 
and conquer to push through the consel'Vative document . By 
giving the people an opportunity to di!cuss and amend, there 
was a n  opportunity tor western interests to object to the 
framework or government . A second convention a msumicg the 
large o�der of rewl'iting and ratifying waa made more palatable 
by providing tor new elections or members . Simila r to the 
arguments put forward by �he Fedsrslis t s ,  the new constitution 
with a system ot ohecks and balances and separation or powers 
waa a preventer of ty�ann7 and e p romoter of government 
ettioienoy. Needless to say, the tyranny was really unrestrained 
d9mocracy and the efficiency was a bicameral legislatureo 
19MorisoD, "Struggle over the Adoption of the 
Constitution , "  390-2; Francis 'l'horpe (ed . )  Fe4eral 
and Statt Consti tut i�gs (Washi ngton : u. s .  Government 
Printing Ottioe, l90 , III , 1889-1911 . 
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Massachusetts was the last state to adopt a new "i-evolutionacy" 
charter; yet , the tlnished produot waR more oonse?"Vative than 
all other state oonstitution .20 
Approval of a constitution did not eliminate all the 
agitation in the western eountiesp but due to the tiscal 
policy pursued by the ooosel"Vativs leaders, the protests by 
the t•ermers were more economic than poli tioa l .  The mai.n 
prog�am of the legis+ature at the conclusion of the wa r was 
to enact a conservativ• revenue policy--the rapid 1'9demption 
or the public debt . The me?'ohants had a specia l interest in 
both the state and national debt� and their influence over 
legi�lation was obYious .  The state wae en joying a high tide 
of p�osperity and the program at the tillle did not seem Ho 
p�eposterous � First, Massachusetts appraised her inte�est• 
bearing treasury notes, not at their depreciated value, but 
at their face value when computing the state debt . This 
policy aotuall� doubled the etete 1 s  indebtedness and gave 
some individuals who bad purchased the notes at a depreciated 
value unmerited gains . Second, the General Court passed a 
series of acts in 1781 which consolidated the public debt a nd 
moved up the date of termination :from 1788-89 to 1786-89 .  
Later :tn the spring the Court created consolidated notes 
which were in exchang• for old paper money and certificates . 
These certificates which bore ContJJOund interest r-ates payable 
in specie equa lled $4,605,500 . In July additio Dal notes 
20East, •critical Period, "  353; Morison , "Struggle 
Ov$r the Adoption of the Constitution, " 362, 384. 
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equa ling $833,700 tor soldiers back pay was appl'Oved by the 
legis tnturo � In other words 11 Massachu�etts had taken !ls he.r 
goal to p-..y off her publlo debt totalling $.5 ,439 , 000 by :!. 789 . 
Inter�st � lone i'i-om Julyy 1782!1 to October� 1?86� woul d tota l 
$83lt,500 i n  hard money. 21 Becaus� the stattt govertllllent 
pursued a restrictive ourrenoy p rogram by stopping the p�inting 
of pape� money and consolidating the notes a l ready in clrcu­
lation3 th8 farmers protested the in8qttity ot the state ' s  tax 
s true tu re .., '!'hose who could not sf'tord it were paying the mo st 
becaus� taxes were primarily based upon lands and poll s .  In 
Nov•mber, 1786, th$ General Court deala red that the estates 
paid about two-thirds of the state ' s  taxe s .  When the state 
legislatu�e apPropriated money for expenditures ,  the State 
Trea surer automatically i s sued ws:rrants to the counties and 
towns to collect the revenue � County courts meeting i n  
quarterly s es si ons a ssessed the v�lue o r  eaeh man ' s  reel 
e s tate ; the sherirf collected the taxes �  T'b.e other form of 
direct taxation was the ratable poll or head tax on a ll males 
over sixteen. The General Court elao announced in 1786 th.st 
one-third of the state debt had to he raised by ratable polls . 
Because Massachusetts levied enormous taxes be tween 1780 and 
1786J direct taxes averaged more than three pouoda a yeGP for 
each or the 90, 000 adult males in the stete o The farmer was 
2? paying a third of• his annual income in taxes \) · - Consolidating 
21Ferguson, Power ot Purse, 245; Dewe�, "Economic 
Conditions , " 352; East, 6drl\1ca1 Period , " 3S5. 
2") "Nettela, National Eooo9m:y,, 86-7 ; Dewey, "Eoorioruie 
Condi t i on s , "  348-9; faylor, We�tern Massachusetts, 138-9; 
MGrri11 JenRon� The New Nsti?:nc; : A Hlstoji pf t§e United 
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the state debt was the easiest part of the financial 
p r-ogr-am it:1st1.tuted by the legi s l a ture . Collecting the 
�evenu� to p�y the state debts pr.oved to be the most 
dift'1.e1'l t te.�li:. 
CHAPTER III 
Because the Massachusetts government atter 1780 was 
more responsive to the demands of the mercantile int erests 
than to the agrarian interests , the state ' s  fiscal p rogram 
was closely correlated to the commercial conditions or the 
times and the desires of the mercha nts . During the 1780 ' s  
two administrations dominated by merchant governors , John 
Hanooek and James Bowdoi n ,  �ose to powe r .  Hancock, who was 
more popular with the agrarians than with the commercials , 
pursued a moderate fiscal policy so a s  not to lose his popu­
larity with either group . The first order or business tor the 
new go�ernment in 1780 had been to psse a law instituting a n  
annual tax levy of $240,000 t o  b e  collected over the ne x t  
seven years and payable in specie only. The revenue collected 
was to be used to pay oft outstanding notes and the interest 
on loans which were mostly in the hands ot the mercantile­
eredi tor class . The agrarian representatives to the General 
Court were quick to oppose this increased tax load and worked 
to enact laws levying taxes on commerce. Circumstances were 
in their tavor o  The Court had to find a n  additional tax 
source a year later because direct taxation was not bringing 
in enough revenue. In November, 1781, the legislature levied 
a moderate excise tax upon spiri t s ,  tea s ,  and oarriages to pay 
the interest on state secul"itiea .  Cider and brandy often made 
32 
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b7 western farmers were defined as spirits according to the 
act . The western farmer• p�tested the inequity ot not 
taxing real luxuries . The tirat tax on imports was levied a 
year later. It was not protective enough to d1si-upt commerce; 
howeYer, the preamble or the act was apologetic about the 
injurious nature ot the polio7 but stated that the duties wea-e 
to be eolleoted only until aix months atter the peace . 
Generally speaking, tew artioles were s ingled out tor special 
duties snd the rates on moat 0011111oditiea were between � to 
fiYe percentv The merchants wei-e appareotl7 sure that they 
oould paas the tax on to the consumer in the retail prioes .
1 
When the war ended and tn. British abip1 began to 
oosnpete with tti. Hassaohueette carry-ing trade, the regulation 
ot commerce took preoedenoe over the colleotion or revenue . 
The state ' s  attitude waa refleoted by her delegates to the 
Continental Coogre s a .  Although other compl-.x iaauea and 
motiyes were involYed, Gorham , O.rry, and King worked to get 
natio�al law• and toreign oommeroial treaties taYoring American 
oonn eroe . Th• impost or dutie• on imports was the tirst oppor­
tunity by wtrl.ch the delegates bad a ebance to work tor their 
state ' s  adYantage . Nathaniel Gorham, a Charleston merobant, 
openly endorsed tbe impost program which gave more power to the 
federal govermnent to regulate oomeroe , Soon after be entered 
Congresa, Gorham attended a meeting ot ana\ionaliata" which 
Condition s . "  
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inoluded Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, delegates from 
N•w York and V1�ginia �espectively, at the home ot Thomas 
Piteimmons, a Phil•delphia merchant. Knowing that tb.e war 
was drawing to a olose and that the previous tiacal p�ogram of 
the Superintendent ot Finacce, Robert Morris ,  bad tailed, the 
group came to a general agreement on what proposals to make to 
Congl9ess on federal tinancea . '!'hey agreed to limit Congress 
to requesting a seoond impost from the states rather than 
eeelcing a n  amendment to atrengthen the Articlea on the federal 
government ' s  power to tax . Lea�ning trom the �ailure ot the 
impost or 1781 whioh had been approved by all states except 
Rhode Island, the oomm1tte• limited the i�poet to e pe�iod 
ot twenty-tiYe 7ears and allowed the states to ohoose the 
oolleotora . In an attempt to obtain a steady �ource ot 
t-eYenue, they asked that atatea commit long•tel'llS taxes tor 
te4eral purposes . SeeiDg the opportun1t7 to regulate tl98de 
and colleot te4•r•l revenue, Gorham • •  attitude towards the 
program was ta•orable •od pointed. On the floor ot Congress 
in January, 1783 , be opposed le'f'Ying interest on states which 
had detault�d in requ1a1tion payments . He alao opposed • tax 
on salt beoauae euoh • leT}' would hurt New England tiaheries . 
Accordiog to Ma41eon • s  account, he thought that Congress would 
best oontine their attention "tor the present to an impost on 
trade whioh had been carried so tar towa rds an accomplishment 
and to r .. o•• the objections which b.84 retarded it • • • • n2 
2a.111ard Huot ( ed . ) ,  The w0B,1n!' 0£ J!!I£ Mt�iaon (New York : G .  P .  Putnam ' s  Sons, l� , �. j 7 . rea ter 
cited ae Hunty Madi1on. 
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Gorham also m•ntioned limiting the terms , letting states 
nominate the collectors, and appropriating a specific 
amount u In a letter to Ca leb Davi3, a state legislator in 
1783, he predicted that without the impos t, "the Oontederacy 
would diseolYe & "J Gorham su�ported the nationa l  prog�am ror 
his state ' s  benefit . Elb?'idge Gerry also tavor•d the impost 
and desired to us• tb.e issue tor political pul";)oaes .. to 
S.ptember, 1783 ,  he wrote to the Committee or the Maesaehusetts 
Assembly headed bJ' Samuel Adams that he had warned Congress . 
that unti l the remonstrances from Messaohuaetts were red�essedj 
their oonstituenta would not a1prove the impos t .  The state ' s  
demands were the reducing of salaries and •xpen•es of the 
federal goveM'Jl'Dent, th• honoring ot old emissions by Congttess $ 
the establi shing of a civil li s t ,  and the granting of eommu• 
tations to the �•tired Continenta l otticere . Ctttrry conclude,d 
that eaeh state bad a constitutional check over the Congress 
by witholding graata until juatioe was obtai�ed .4 
Th••• ••nti.aents could have be•n enough to pr'event 
l"atitication of the impost by Ma asaahusetts in the critical 
days ot debate. Samuel Adame, according to Stephen Higginson 
who was another delegate to Congress , suppresaed the letter in 
a tit ot m•r• ":forget:t'\tlne•� n  and, in his opinion . Gllowed the 
3Ferguaon, Power of Purst, 166; Ea st, "Critical 
Period , "  )68 . 
4Eaund c .  Burnett (ed . ) ,  !fture ot hmb•£• ;r 
tht Oontip,p!pl C�!''lfs ( Waahington s aarnegl• '.fnsfi.i ute 
of tla sfi!ng on, !� , fII, 296-7. Hereafter cited as 
Burnett, Letter�· 
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measure to pass in "an appa �ent zeal for the public good 
on this ooca s ion . "5 
Caleb Strong and Ru.fus King we�• both members ot 
the state legislature when the Congress called tor the 
impost or 1783. No :records are extant &r , S.t:iong' s partie ­
i pation' in the l'atiticationJ however, King rose · to a place 
ot leadership by advocating the ratitica·tion ot the imp.os t .  
'l'he meroantile interests and the agrarian interests had 
reversed their positions on the impost . The eommeroials 
had opposed the first grant wi�hout success in 1781; but 
they now favol'ed the new 'bill b•eause it was a ste� in 
. 
l'egulating natftmd trade . They also knew that the impost 
would be a consistent 1 ouroe ·or revenue to be used to pay 
ott the national debt in which they we�• vitally interest•d� 
King continued tu woi-k tor the t»as8age ot t-he impost even 
when he became a delegate to Congress meeting in New York, 
1786. In a letter to Ge�rry in August ot that year, he wrote 
that he "had not been the last man in urging the adoption 
"6 
of this Mea!;ure " 
St�ng • s  position on the impost oannot be determi ned ; 
howeve r, hie knowledge ot Massachueetts commerce was attested 
by the fact that he was chosen to serYe on a joint committee 
to give Thomas Jerterson, United States Commissioner to Prance, 
5James T .  Austin, !rb• Lite et Elbrid�! Ger� with 
at�te!!!eo�ary jitttets (Boston1 ;eils ana tli y, 18�J, !, 
-r. Heieea eie olted as Austin, Gerrz. 
6Fues s ,  8King 1 "  D. A. B . ,  V, 389 ;  Main, Antifedaral1 sts 5 
86; Burnett, Letter! , VIII, 454 .  
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information about the state ' s  trade. Strong was appointed 
along with Jam•s Lowell by the Senate in Jun• ,  1784, to 
serve this functio n ,  but the commission did not meet be-
cause the House ot R•presentatives tailed . to appoint thei � 
7 three representetives .  The signi:t'ieanoe of th• nomination 
was that Strong, who came from the Co�neoticut River Valley, 
w•s chosen instead ot eaatern members who should haTe known 
more about counnerce tb.an a we•tern member. 
When the other states moved s iowly in ratifying the 
impos t ,  Massachusetts in 1784 moved on its own to prot&ot 
the state ' s  trade. The General Court enacted legislation 
which favored Massaehusetta shipping more than proteeting 
the state ' s  infaat indus tries . Rates on paper, candle s ,  
soap� linseed oil, leather, beef, and pork were levied a t  
� to 7 percent. While finished goods such a a  saddles , 
boots, and plated•ware were taxed 12\ percent, the rates on 
raw p roducts were hardly protective while the moderat• rates 
on finished goode covered only a few luxuries . The real oore 
ot the aot wa s the section on British shipping. Rates on 
goods imported on English ships were twice those rates fixed 
on goods imported on American vessels. Masaaohuaetta furth•r 
exacted duties on the weight of British ships entering her 
ports at five to seven shillings per ton or for the av•rage 
merohantman 500 to 1 , 000 pounds . The aot wa1 deteeti�• 
7Jul1an P .  Boyd ( ed . ) ,  The Papers ot jl'bQ!!es 
Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953 ) ,  
VI f, 32!�n .. ' 
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because Bri tiah ships went to states wl thout these . .  
res t rictions and traoeterred their goods to American ship s o 8 
After Jamee Bowdoin, a Boston merchant� replaced 
Governor John Hancock in 1785, the state began a more 
aggressive progl"am to gorrect the destitute condition o:r 
Massachusetts oollBlel"oe . On April 15. 1785, Boston merchants 
dratted an addreaa to Cong�ess pointing out the distressing 
situatiop of trade . A coD11Dittee was to call �on the state 
legislature to get the Continenta l delegat•s to work tor a 
systematic rftgulation . One other pl"ogram or the group was to 
establish Committees of Co��•spondence to write merehants in 
other states t o  get their cooperation tor action . Also , 
meohanics and artisans ot Boston adopted the same stand R 
month later� John Adams in England reported that these 
published sentiments caused some �•action in  England tor a 
Q 
oommeroial tr•aty. ' But as the situation progressed this 
hope proved to.o optimistio . 
Governor James Bowdoin strengthened by these p•titions 
addressed the legis la ture on May )1, 1785, on tbe subject ot 
oommerce . He said that the legislatu�e must be aware 0£ tho 
restlessness of the people and the degenerate state ot :rore.ign 
trade ,, He stated that there waa an  extravagant use of impol"ted 
goods which caused an un.fa•orable balance ot tzead.e in a l l  
states . England managed her commerce aoco:rding to her own 
8Dewey, "Economic Conditions , "  349-50 . 
9McMas,ers, Ria,orz ot u. s . ,  I, 257 . 
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interests; therefore, America had the right also, but some 
states retuaed to grant Congress the power.  Thi• caution 
might be due to the tear ot delegating power• to Congress . 
He reasoned that the experience ot the preaent situation 
had shown that it waa necea1a17 to grant Oongress control 
ot trade even it limited tor a certain period. He then 
suggested that the states appoint delegates to deoide what 
powers should be gi•en Congress in or-der to cont?'Ol commerce . 
Atter some debate, the General Court pasaed a resolution that 
a convention ot d•legatea trom every state be called to revise. 
the Article e .  1'be OoTernor waa instructed to write to the 
other state executiYea and urge passage ot laws to hinder 
the policy ot o,..at Britain . Fi-om dooumenta which are 
available, New Hampshire was the only state wbioh reacted 
favorably to the letter• which Bowdoin sent to the other 
stat• executives . ETen •o, the state delegate• to the 
Congress tailed to abide by their instl'tlctiooa .10 
'l'he failure ot the Massochusetta delegates to follow 
their instructions need• aome explanation becauae their 
actions and opinions indicated the level ot their constitu­
tional thinking at this critical point in their state ' s  
history. Gorham and Strong were not delegates, but King and 
Ger17 were sitting in Congress along with Doctor Samuel Holton .  
Gorham had been rie-•lected in June, 1785, but would not take 
his seat until the beginning ot 1786 .  Strong waa sitting aa  
lOMcMastera, Hi1toz:z ot U .  s . ,  I ,  256-59 . 
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a state senato� in the General Court o Unfortunately, no 
records are available of their opinions on commercial regu­
lations . However, in the public and private oori-eapondenoe 
or King and Gerry, both men show they favored and worked tor 
oommercial regulatione, but they opposed general amendment 
ot the Articles ot Confederation . '!'he paradox ot eupporticg 
the fot'lner and not the latter was evidence of the level or 
thinking or th••• two delegates on constitutional change � 
In April, 1784, Ger17 bad reflected his sta t e ' s  interest in 
demanding a national system ot commercial protection.  He 
presented a atat•ment in which he reported that Great Britain 
had adopted restriotions destructive to American oonnerce to 
the West Indies . He observed to his colleaguea in Congress 
that unless Congrea1 "be vested with powers competent to the 
protection of oommeroe , the1 states can never command 
reciprocal adTantages in trade; and without these, our foreign 
11 
comme�oe must deoline and eTentually be annihilated . "  Gerry 
got a chance to implement his report when he was appointed to 
a Congressional committee in December, 1784, which was to 
investigate foreign and interstate tre�e. The committee 
reportea in Pebruary or the following year that Congress 
should be vested with powers to regulate trade by plaoing 
duties on 1mpo�t•d foreign goods . Thia p ropos a l  wae a call 
for granting Congreea the power to tax . The act wes to be 
llBeard, E6.;nomio Intfilretafion, 95-6 cited trom 
Sanderson, Biosrap or the S �ers iBjl ed . ) ,  I ,  230 0  
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in foree for a limited number of yea ps and a l low th• states 
to use the tax collections . Nine states bad to approve the 
ordinanoe to put it into eftect . 12 
In the communication exohange between Gerry and his 
fellow delegate, Rufus King , over• th• passage of this contro­
versial comme�oe-reYenue package , both men displayed cautious 
optimism . When Boston mobs in the spring or 1785 rebelled 
against the British trade monopoly and imported good s ,  Gerry 
wrote King , 0You will see by the papers, the Spizeit of the 
people et Boston, I am happy to see things in this situation .. "
13 
In a retu�n letter, King reported on May 1 ,  1785, that the 
Whig merohante or New York would make similar opposition to 
the unloading of British goods . He then added that he 
favored the use ot more moderate methods .  
I!' this well-founded. uneasiness i s  attended 
to by wise and moderate men, in the several 
States, it may be improved to purposes most 
benetioial, to our national commerce • • • 
too much precipitancy may injure a s  moderatio�4 and delay haYe ever served our true intere s t .  
One month later, GePry a n d  Kiog • s  opt1m1am was choked 
by disappointment and frustra tio n .  There was a great uneasi• 
neas among the merchants and traders in New York, reported 
King, beoause only eight states had oomplied with the �esolu­
tion. Having seoond thoughts , King wondered !t the act granted 
12Burnet t ,  Letters, VIII, 13 , 16. 
13Ib1d . ,  108n 14Ibid . ,  108 . 
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the power to p rohibit ,  not to regulate trade . He asked if 
the provision would have been enough to remedy the mischiefs 
15 to commerce . G�rry indicated his disillusionment of the 
whole attair when in his return letter he stated that the 
set was the best which could be obtained et  the tim•· 
Although the ordinance was probably vastly 111adequate for 
the need8 or the d&J9 he believed that the problem would 
have to work itself out oaturallyn "It Congress and the 
Legis latures have not sense sufficient to rectify the 
16 eommerc1�1 Evils, tpey will remedy themselves . "  Gerry 
obviously favored letting the natural course ot the economy 
correct the problem rather than tinker with the Artielec . 
Within the context or recent defeat, the Massaohusette 
delegates had reoei••d the insti-uotions ot the General Court 
to call for a convention to make "such alterations and amend-
ments as shall �ender them • • •  conformable to the Spirit or 
the Confede rstion . "17 The recent failure oould have been e 
rea son for the retusal ot the delegates to present the Court ' s  
resolution. SatnUel Holton, a tuture Anti -federalist. wrote 
to the Governor in August stating that the p�evailing opinion 
"gave nR no cause to expect tbe adoption ot the plan p roposed 
by th• Legialature . "18 
King followed a similar line or argument when he 
Wl'Ote to a famil7 fl'iend, Daniel Kilbamy, in July. King 
15Burnett, Ifttere , VIII, 121. 
17Ib1d . ,  189n. 
l6Ib1�. , 12ln . 
18Ib1d . , 188-9 . 
desoribed the p roblem ot conci liating all factions of the 
country to get the passage of regulatory law s .  He was very 
critical o� the merchants who were complaining that ell the i r  
grievances originated with the British nation ; yet , they were 
responsible for excessive importations on credit .  King con­
tinued that those who stated Congress muat have more power 
o� commerce would be ruined did not comprehend the national 
-picture . The South•·l"D states wex-e by nature tree traders and , 
therefore , opposed en7 eommel"eial treaty or regulation·s. A s  
long a s  the Eastern states would delegate powers to Congress 
to regulate trade and the Southern states would not , King saw 
that there wee no chance tor unanimous agr•ement needed to 
amend the A rticles . 19 
The p rimary reason tor the rejection of their o�der 
from the r.gi s lature was the conflict i n  practical politics 
between the delegates and Bowdoin � The Goveroor, supported 
by the eastern mercantile interests, had proposed amending 
the Articles by the use of a gene�al com•ention. On 
September 13, Ki.ng on behalf' of O.rry and Holton7 wrote a 
detailed explana tion of' thei r f'e290DS for delaying the 
1n struct1ons .. 20 lting stated that many were ot the opinion 
Ruru� K1�:0�:;·�o�: n�� ��11P�t11!t:tH!.�0me�'ff�·b�f6. 
ner••tter oited 88 King, lj4,.te.ot Kill• 
20The original letter was lost so there i s  some 
con.fusion about who wrote the letter. Burnett favors Gerry 
and c .  King favors King . I believe it was King because there 
are similarities between tb.11 letter and the one KiDg sent to 
Nathan Dan e� See footnote 23 . 
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that states were not experienced enough to determine the 
extent of powers to be vested in the central government. It 
there was a necessity- to strengthen the commercial powers or 
CongrGss , King wanted to know the answers to four questions . 
First, should these powers be temporary? King suggested s 
fifteen yea� limit because that length of time was best to 
promote foreign coUJZDercial treaties � Second, should oot the 
adoption of the temporary powers dspend upon their effect s ?  
At this point King speculated that any delegation of power t o  
Congress could not b e  revoked; therefo re, any threat to 
liberty must be sufficiently understood and digested . Third , 
should any a lteration be made by s method which was not 
expressly pointed out in tho Confederation? King judged that 
the convention method might be unconstitutional aooording to 
the Thirteenth a..ticle and that any provision proposed by this 
method would be of doubtful passage. Fourth, should the con· 
vention be authori�e4 to i-eviae the ContederatioD generally 
I 
o r  only tor expreea purpoaea? A call for general revi sion 
could destroy the re�ublioan principle• tor which the Revolution 
was fought . Iting reported that there wel'• trienda of an aris­
tocracy who would exert tb.emaelvea to strengthen their c ontrol 
over a new government . He concluded that the inoon�eniences ot 
the present Confederation were p ret&reble to the risk of general 
diaaention which might approach anarchy and prepare the way tor 
,21 
a ruinous system of government. 
21King, Letters of Kin,g, II,  60-5 . 
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Constitutional revision 0£ the Confederation was not 
a program which Gerry and King desi�ed in 1785 � The sincerity 
of their conv:!.otions was indicated in lettere during the month 
ot Septel'lbor to two Massachusetts obaervet's on the Sl>Ot .. 
King wrote to Natbac Dene. a memPetr of the General Court� 
asking him to re-•x•mine the motives ror paasing the resolves 
to revi se the Artiolea .
22 
King oonoeded that additional 
commercial powei:-a veabed in Congress with pl'Ope.r reetrletiona 
and i"or a limited time were greatly desired.. He agreed with 
the moat republican and best informed men in the country who 
t'a�ored a limited period ot time . i•1:t the oon.federat1.on , "  
he ooneluded. u1a generally aubmitted for revision, the 
result would be l••a Pepublioan than tta pNs.c>t one. n
23 
Gerry a lso expz-eseed his tear iD amending the Articles in a 
letter Samuel Adams, p�eaiding ofricer of the state Sena te �  
I am happy to find that We unite in Sentiment 
th �he N•eeaei t7 or vestirJg Oongreee with rnore 
commercial powers : and flatter myaelt we shall 
not ditteri in making them in the f"ir$t Insta.1100 
tempo�aryJ and ln opposing a general Revision 
of the Con.federa tion. 1 t (�lie) is difficult 
to determine on a good Expedient, to remedy 
our p resent Evi1�4 but We shall attempt i t ,  
if Time perm! t s .  
In the spring aesaiorl of the legislature, the state 
representatives had second thoughts about the1� resolution of 
1785 and accepted the reasons given by the delegates "' The state 
lost its chanoe tor leadership in a movement to x•evise the Articles . 
22x1ng , Lstter� of 11,{i.Qg, II, 67 ... 70 .. 
23Bn:r-nett, !:!ttttr..�' VIII, 268 t:t.. 
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The Geoera·l Court in the winter of 1785 had taken the 
initia tive to make a t'inel attempt to restrict ruinous 
British tnde on a state sca l e .  The first pet-t o t  the law 
prohibited British ••saela trom loading Ame!'ican gf)ods. 
Masaaohus et t e  wanted to firport Un! ted States goods only in 
Amer.1 can ships ,  that is , Massachuaetta ships . The ae·cond 
aection of the law waa to eom• d.8g�•• to protect her �oundling 
indus tr:i.ea end at the aam• time, Peatrain extrangsnt expend­
itures so as to redress the imbalanfte or trade. Th.a sot 
1tated that i t  vaa 
highly necessary tor the welfare and 
happiness of all states ,  and more 
especially auoh as are republican to 
encourage agriculture, the impl"OVemer::it 
of l'aw matettials and manu.f'actul'e• 1 a api:ri t 
or induat 17 �  frugality and economy, and at 
the same tim• discourage iu;�t7 and 
ext ravagance of avery kind .. c_ 
Fitty ... eight eommodi t5.es were p roh:5_bi ted and an ov6n-•all 
increase of. dut;ias of' twenty-rive ���·cent on specific 
art!clss wag leviee .. 
26 
King v:l.ewed w1 th favor the developments in h:ls home 
state to get other 1'tates to agree to l"'egulate out�ide the 
author:l.ty- of Congre s s ,, He reported to John Adants in the 
winter of' 1785, that New Hampshir-e und Massachusetts hsd 
passed Nfivigation Acts restricting commerce from forei gu 
states � He hoped that Rhode Isler.id,, New York, Pennsylvania ,  
Maryland!' and South Carolina would do likewi s e  because "the 
25:oewey , "Econ0m1c · conditions , n 350. 
1�7 
merchAnts throughout all the states are agreed; they 
urge tho nee�ss ity of commerci a l :t'egulation� � • • n27 
Go�han did not share K1ng 1 s  onthusiasm tor the 
Navigation Aets ,, Ma ssachusetts eventually repealftd the law 
in J'uly, 1786 , because ehe did not get any cooperation f'rom 
her neighbortng !ta tee . Go:r-ham had favored repeal as early 
a s  June when in  n letter to Caleb Davis, he observed thai; 
the law was no good without the �ther states cooperating 
and thAt the restrictions were harm£ul to the iote:t>nal 
inte��ets or th� state especia lly since Maine was advocating 
sepa ration from the Commonwealth on this iaaue. 28 Gorham 
tney aettu�lly have wanted the full prePSsuieea and demands of' 
the country ' s  me�entile interests brought upon the delega tes 
to the �o�theoming Annapolis Convention , a oommeroial conven­
tion apon�ored by Virginia , and any plen whereby the states 
would ss8um& a �ederal !'unction ( such as they did in funding 
the national debt) might wrock the ohanoes tor getting a 
stronger netional union c Early in 1786 Gorham had tried to 
get Cale� Davis to support anothe� proposal to� a federal 
ool'lvention. He all!lo deairied Divis to use bis influence to 
get the Court to appoint delegates to Annapoli s �  Aa Gorham 
saw the politios ot the situation , the real purpose ot the 
convention was to accept an inTj.tation by the South. He 
atated that 
27K1og, 14ts ot Kin_g, I, 115� 
28Eaet, "Critical Period, " 372n. 
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we have Men among us who have sufficient 
commercial knowledge, but a�e somewhat 
Antitedettsl in thei r opinion� ..  Yott will 
therefore Judge how oecesaa ry it is to 
3end Men of good Federal ideas and th.at 
:tf tt-:.ey are not so they mF!y oirerthrow 
the whole plan .. 29 
Whether Gorham would hsve nominated Gerry, who was 
then s i  tt1.ng in the General Cou�t , to attend a• a woi:tthy 
"Federslist" is doubtful, but in any case, the man from 
Marblehead refused to accept a nomination to attend on the 
grounds that its oompetenee was too reitricted.30 His 
actions would suggest that Gerry wanted stronger me&�ur•s 
in other problem1 or national concern . unro�tu�ately no 
document exists to Ta .. ify or elaborate thi• point . 
King ' s  viewm on Annapolis wei-e ambivalent compa�•d 
to Gor�m 1 a  becauae King was �ear:rul of too great a revision 
in the Articles . To John Adami he wrote that the esteemed 
group of men gave rea.son to hope that "the r•ault would be 2 
union of opinions on the sub ject of ·�om::iercial regulations 
th�ough all the atate• � "3l To personal friends sueh a s  
Jonathan Jackson, he atated that he was akeptical about the 
meaaures which would be proposed and suapicioua or tbe motives 
of the Vi�giniana . He thought that the majo�ity ot Southern 
planters ravored regulation b7 individual states rather. than 
a genera l system und•� discussion at Annapolis.32 
29East,  "C:ritical Psriod .r n  373 ,.  
-
30Moriso�, "Gerry, " D .  A .  B .  
31Burnetit, Lttt1:re , VIII , 3514.•5. .32 . Ibid . ,  ,388 -90 .. 
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King ' s  fear of the aristocrats of the South continued 
fo r the rest of the yea r ,  but changes in the national scene 
caused him to reconsider the product of the convention . In 
his letters to Gerry during the following months , he spoke 
about the "visionary pro jects" before Congress and the rumors 
about a general revision of the Articles .  To offset these 
problems , King wished that more Hew England states had 
representatives in Congress and that he desired a conference 
i,.;ith Gerry. 33 After being "the daily witness of the humil­
iating s i tuation ot the federal government : without power, 
destitute of revenu e ,  pledged for engagement s ,  and without 
ability to execute them , n34 King wrote Jonathan Jackson about 
the variou3 opinions in Congress on the federal governmen t .  
The first widely held opinion was that there was a need to 
pull together the divergent interests of the opposing states . 
Thi s group believed that the Confederation was born in a 
common calamity and that there should be new p ressure to 
reform the government . A second attitude which King labelled 
"by no means the least  respeetable1135 held that nothing 
could be done to the original plan because there w6re too 
many errors . Because this group believed that a league 
bet�,;ee� s�aJ. l ,  unequa 1 sovereienties never dj d nor could work, 
King reported that their plan called ror the complete 
33Burnett, Letters , VIII ,  356, 279,  384 , 393 . 
34KinG , Life of YJ.ng, I ,  611 . 
35Burnet t ,  Letters , VIII ,  458 . 
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reorganization of the number and the size of states and 
confined their responsibilities to internal affairs . Tho 
federal govet-nment would be comp osed of a "vigorous EJ-;:eoutive, 
36 wis e  Legislature and independent Judicia l , "  but Kint; wa s 
ca reful to note that these remarks were not meant to 
authorize mona rchy which he opposed . In King ' s  mind,  both 
of these schools of thought meant that "wise and prudent men 
disce rning the imperfectione or the present Government s ,  co: 
not in s eason and without fea r, propose suitable remadies • • 
Thi s statement indicated that King felt public opin:ton was 
against a change i n  the Articles . Even if Annapolis �oula. 
propose an exclusive plan for the regulation of trade , Kine 
thought that constitutional reform had to be e�tensive . 36 
• • 
1Nh.en King heard the recommendations made by the 
Annapolis Convention, he withheld unqualified s11pport fo r a 
convention. He was in Philadelphia with James Mlldison to p l ea d  
with the Pennsylvania legislature to approve the requi sition 
of 1786 when Ham1 lton .- g nd Egbert Benso n ,  New York delegates 
to Annapoli s ,  came through town . In a letter to Governor 
3m.;do i n ,  King stated thet he wa s not enthusia stic sl:>out a 
gen eral revi sion of the Confederation but he added, "t�e 
Friends of a good federal e;ove4�nment thro\.lgh these states 
lookeo to i t  the Phila delphia convention with anxiety 
and Hope . u39 Apparently King had accepted the opinion 
36nurnet t ,  �a ttcrs , VII I ,  458 . 
38Ibic1 . 
n37 
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of John Adams that Congress was a better agent for change 
than a convent i o n .  King wrote to Adams that "Congress can 
do a l l  a convention c a n ,  and certainly with more safety t o  
o rigi na l principles . "40 Kine reinforced this beli e f  when h e  
spoke before the General Court i n  October, 1786. �·Ji thin the 
framework of the Artic les , there was no legal p rovision for 
a national convention a c c o rding to King. The Congress and 
then the state legislatures had exclusive p ower to debate a n d · 
propose aroendments to the Article s , a n d  then the people must 
ratify. 41 King would be c�nverted to support the oonvention 
by events in western Massachusetts . 
C a leb Strong was a l s o  hearing pes simistic a rguments 
about the Annapolis Convention from his Hamp shire County 
friend and delegate to Congress , Theodore Sedgwick. In 
August , 1786, Sedgwick \vrote Strong that Congress had not 
m&de any decision on its commercial policy in rega rds to 
foreign affa i rs . He b e lieved thot Annapolis would fa i l  
because there were n o  constructive p ropositions t o  b e  a rgue d .  
I n  his mind, the convention was only a false measure presented 
"ui th an intention of defeatinB the enls rGer.lent of the poi.;ers 
of Congress . 1142 Due to the lack of the coopera tion of the 
South on ma tte rs of cornmfn•co , �,e ac-�:ic� p rop o s e d  th8t the 
Eastern States consider framinc a separate confederation . 
40nurnet t ,  Letters , VIIi , 475n . 
41.Kinc, Life of Kine;, I ,  14l� . 
423u rnett, Le t t e r s , VII I ,  l�.15. 
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It becomes us seriously to coote1nplete 
e substitute ; f'or if' we do not cootroul !si<i) 
events t·rG shall be t!iiserobly controlled 0y 
them • • • •  This language wi ll appea r to you 
I am nttraid (§ic:l as  eviden,ce of pusa lanimi ty, 43 
but I do not think that in polit�os I s m  timi d .  
It we can drew an inference a t  this point, St�ong roay have at 
lea s t  agreed with �edgwiok, if not been in favor or othe� 
cha nges in the federal governmen t .  
The idea o f  a !ubconfederation tr.cde up of ea3tern 
states cttossed the mind or King in the winter of l 78S . �le 
rejoiced in th• hope! that seven o r  eight eastern s�ntes �:ould 
form � subcoofederation which might a llow Congress to �cs�­
late trade uniformly throughout i t .  He believed thnt this 
system would be mere advantageous the n a ll the treatie� �na 
a lliances in the world . 44 '.·!bl le he doubted the t the southe rn 
states would relinquish their partial and unfedera l poli=y 
coneeztning commerce, King believed that if ooee '' s po:;e r is 
b rought into existence under the autho�"i ty of the St!.1 tes,  -.1ho 
may generally revise  the Confecerntio n ,  fa 1•e·..tell to the p !"esent 
Republican pla n . n45 
Althouih the M£i s sachusetts deJ_ezs tos "'..:orkad 1;o inc�ease 
the commerJial prosper5. ty �� thei r 3ti,te , they did not '.i;&nt 
completely to revise the Articles et the sam� ti�e nor for �he 
same reesonr, . Influences sucl1 a s  fiscsl polic:,'" a n �  t:1e 
43Bu rnett , Letters, VIII, 415. 44Ibid . ,  389 . 
45East,  1'C r.::.ticc l Pe1•l o� , ·· 371 . 
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internal affai rs of Massachusetts caused the delegates to 
desire revision of the federal government. From their 
experience in serving the state, the delegates became 
increasingly aware of the faults ot the Confederation . 
Gorham earlier than King ore Gerry converted to the 
nnationalist " progPam. Eventually, King observed the 
inetfeetiveness of purely state measures to meet national 
problems. Gerry and Strong were moTed by the internal 
disruptions in weste M> Massachusetts which threatened 
disorder and radicalism to sup�ort a constitutional change . 
CHAPTER IV 
We stern Massachusetts during the 1780 ' s  had become 
the seen• of continuous protests against the government i n  
Boston . The oause or the unrest stemmed basicallJ trom the 
aggressive taxation policy ot the state government during 
a period or economic dislocation . The farmers had a 
legitimate grievance because there was a scarcity ot money. 
The agitators in the western counties called tor the General 
Court to suspend tax collections , to revis e  public salarie s ,  
and to enact stay laws . Joseph Hawley, a member of the 
General Court from Northampton ,  wrote to Ephraim Wright in 
April, 1782, about his observations of the anti ·goveroment 
feelings in the west. He reported that the growing unea s i ­
ness i n  the country was due to the governmen t ' s  dedication 
to pay tor public securities by a l l  future taxes tor which 
the services were long ago given. Yet the same securities 
could not be used to pay the taxes . Hawley continued by 
etating that they were a "fierce 21et ot men, who speak with 
rage and tlame" with whom the government would have diffi-
1 
oulties unle s s  thei r grievances were heard . 
Hawley ' s  comments about threatened mob aotion became 
a i-eality when Samuel Ely, a d1squal1tied olergJ111a n ,  led a 
l "tetter ot Joaepb Hawley to Ephraim Wright , "  
Anerioan Hist2rioal Review , XXXVI ( June, 1931 ) ,  776-8 . 
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mob in April which threa tened the Court sitting a t  Northampton . 
Ely wa s arrested and the insurgents dispersed . Whi le in court 
tacing cha rges of sedition, Ely used the size ot salaries ea 
a basis ot his complaints against the state constitution and 
government . 
The Constitution is broke al�eady. The 
Governor has too much salary , the Judges of 
the Superior Court have too much salary, we 
can get men that wi ll ride the circuit to r 
half the money • • • the General Court should 
not s i t ;  we ��11 pay no more respect to them 
than puppi es . 
The threat or insurrection toroed the Legislature to 
baok down and to paaa some laws to appease the rebels . One 
law made it possible tor taxpayers and debtors to pay their 
debts in kind or gooda rather tb.an by legal tende r .  Governor 
John Hancock, who was very sensitive to the grievances ot 
his constituents ,  urged that the tax lava be firm, but he 
tailed to adminis t rate them etticiently. Between 1780 and 
1785, only one-titth ot the tax levieE were collected . The 
G•�eral Court eve�tually suspended colleetiona in 1785 aod 
in that same year, they d.id cot have enough to meet the 
expenses or the govercment . Eventuall7, Hancock chose to s t ep 
down from the Governorship rather than lose his popularity. 3 
It was with Hancock ' s  resignation in 1785 that Boston 
merchants were able to get one of their numbers, James Bowdoi n ,  
2J•m•a T .  Adame , N9w Eneland in tee ��ubli�, 
1776-1850 (Boston: Li ttle, Brown a nd Co . , 1 ), ! 2 .  
3yi&�Donald, E .  Pluribus Unum ,  137-9; Dewey, 
"Economic Conditions ," 351. 
elected to the Governorebip . Bowdoin ' s  tax program was a s  
active as  Hancock ' s  had been inactive and demonstrated that 
the administration favored the mercantile-creditor interests . 
Payment of the public debt became the p rimary motive or the 
tax p rogram . Stephen Higginson, a Bostoc merchant, reported 
to John Adame in December, 1785, that Mas sachusetts ha d 
become very respectable, especially in money matters . 
Asserting that their government was much more liberal than 
neighboring states , he enclosed a report which was "calculated 
not only to p rovide amply tor the Interest on the Stat$ ' s  
Deb t ,  but t o  reduce the priociple . "4 He b.ad strong hopes that 
it would pase  the next session and reported that it was the 
"general Sentiment that we can and ought to gradually to 
reduce the Debt . "5 
Under the administratio n ' s  leadership , the legis la ture 
pas sed a series of strong tax measures . In his address to the 
legis lature in May, Bowdoin urged not only trade restriction 
but als o  legi s lation to pay off the state debts in the re­
quired time. As it will be recalled , the General Court 
responded by increasing the poll ta.x and passing an excis e  
tax and a s tamp tex . The Court also gave the Governor power 
to remove all county sheriffs who refused to force tax 
collectors to do their duty. Bowdoin even p roposed that 
4"Letters of Stephen Higginson , "  Annual Report o f  
A .  H .  Association : 1896, I ,  Edited by J.  Franklin Jameson, 
(�ashlngton : U. S .  Government Printing Office , 1897 ) ,  732 . 
Hereafter cited a s  "Letters of Higginson . "  
5Ibi d .  
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farmers unable to pay thei r taxes in c a s h  should cut down 
trees , burn them , and turn the a shes over to the state agents 
who would apply the selling p rice to the farme r • e  tai 
account . The new admini s t rgtion ins i sted on tax collections 
6 
even i f  the payments were in kind .  
Another legislative ?rog ram which reflected s trong 
o reditor interests was p rivste debt collecti o n . The 
legislature reimposed strict rules on tho se who defaulted 
i n  their payment to oredi tol"a by to roi ng them to sell theii­
personal and rea l p roperty. A debtor was liable to a j a i l  
sentenoe i f  the receipts .from a public s a le o f  his goods 
tailed to pay the credito r ' s  elsi� . With this new law 
a nxious credito�s vePe able to collect debts which were 
delayed by tender lows p a s fted i n  Hanoook ' s  admini stration . 
In Worcester County there were 2 ,000 suits a n d  the oonT�otion 
rate wa s very high . 7 
To the western farmer, the gove rnment ' s  favoritism 
towa rds o i-editor inte�esta CPeated hostility whioh fil'st 
took the form ot pea ceful petition and then active violence . 
County convention�, . & device used during the Revolution, 
continued to be used by the western rermePs a s  a vehicle 
of p�otest long after 1775. The ea s te rn seaboard conserva ­
tives were disturbed by the exces sive use ot th• conventions 
i n  the we�t . David Sewa l l ,  a selectman trom Essex County, 
6 MoMaaters , Hiatorz ot u. s . ,  I ,  301 . 
7Nette l s ,  National Eoonomy, 87 . 
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commented in October, 1786, that whenever there was a 
measure i n  the General Court upon which a n  individual 
d isagreed , the member returned to his constituents to 
mis represent the doing or the legislature . This smell 
politician would say that the people must now act or be 
undone. 
f.rhey] Sti� up a County Convention , a nd by 
Trump eting Lies from Towne to Towne get one 
collected and consisting of pe�aons of small 
ab111ti e s - -or little o r  no property • • •  or 
no great Integrity--and these Geniuses vainly 
eonoeiving they are competent to regulate the 
affairs ot State--make s ome ha e t7 incoherent 
Resolves and these end in Sedi t i o n ,  Riot and 
Rebellion . ts 
Two years before Sewall wrote these comJtent s ,  conventions held 
i n  Suffolk and Worcester counties censured and condemned the 
state Senate and th• courts . They called upon the common 
people to set up a oew legislature more responsive to their 
needs . 9 A Bristol County convention peti tiooed the Geoe ra·1 
Court for paper money ea well as other reforms : lower taxes 
on land and polla, reduction of salaries or state ottioials . 
remoTal of the legi slature t�oa Boston, abolition ot the state 
senate, taxation ot luxuries ,  and the ending ot foreclosures 
by abolishing or adjourning court s . 10 
When all ot the proposals advocated by the county 
conventions in 1784 a nd 1785 we�• defeated by the Legislature, · 
the westel'n oountiea were i-eady to take more direct action . 
8 McMa sters, H11to17 or u, ,s,, I, 305. 
lONettels ,  Nf.tiontl 19onomy, 87. 
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After a year of hara s sing the judges and p reventing them from 
holding the Quarter Sessions in August, 1786, the debtors 
under the reluctant leader8hip of Captain Daniel Shays , a 
reti�ed revolutiona ry soldier, kept four western courts from 
sitting. Governor Bowdoin issued • p roclamation against 
unlawful a s semblies and called out the militi a .  Shays ·led 
the rebels in an attack on Springfield in Janua ry, 1787. H1s 
two objec tives w•re to capture a rm s  fpom the federal arsenal 
and to p revent the state Supreme Court t�om indicting the 
1n�urgenta to� treason. The a ttack tailed when 1100 men led 
by Shays broke and ran at the first volley of the m1lit1a 1 s  
canno n .  A fl'esh force under General Ben jamin Linool�, 
tinanoed by loa n s  from eastern merchant s ,  arrived to pursue 
the routed mob through western Mas sachus etts . Eventually the 
rebels aca ttered in to the surrounding s tates without ever 
8ffec t1vely meeting the militia 1n a real battle. 11 
All in all, the :-ebellion was a rela tively bloodless 
•ffai�, but it was a protest against intolerable conditions . 
The state exhibited both force on one ha nd and meroy on the 
othe�. Governor Bowdoin i n  September had urged laws to s ecure 
both the safety ot the state and to rectify the grievances of 
the weRterners . The General Court passed laws ravorable to 
the taxpayer and the debtor. The use of personal property a s  
tende r for tax es was broadened t o  include forty &rticle s . 12 
llTaylor, Weste rn Mts s9chusetts,, 128-168. 
12newey, "Economic Conditions , "  348. 
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In the spring elections of 1787 the people returned 
rep resentatives s711pathetic to the cause or the debtors. 
IA.iring the first session •nd the se ssions tor the next few 
yea rs , the G,nex-al Court pas sed a stay law, a temporary 
suspension ot �'bt eolleotion a .  They also reformed the legal 
tee sys tem which bad been fairly high. The direct tax levies 
were reduced and the state beban to collect more revenue from 
a n  excise tax . r..ter, in 1789, the leede�s or the revolt vere 
pardoned and an amnesty aet removed the fear o f  punishment 
from the followe rs. Prosperity returned and the concessions 
by the government loet their dramatic err.ect . 13 
The revolt by the western famers had little etrect 
in changing the ibternal structure of Massaehu�etts polities ; 
but the rebellion had !I significant effect in national 
politic � .  To Ge�ry and King, Shays • s  revolt was an event 
which convinced them tha t there wa s a need fo r a stronger 
federal govermnent. Gerry who had steadfastly opposed sny 
revi sion of the Articles was not visibly moved by the 
insurgents 1n the tall of 1786. Writing from Cambridge in 
December, he reported to King that the "In gurgents stopped 
the court a t  Worchester, but dared not approach Cambridge . "  
In a matter-of-fa ct tone he added, "We shell see whether 
Mr. C!heise �1� 1s to govern the Commonwealth or be branded 
a s  he is a daring Rebel • • • •  ul4 Events i n  Massachusetts 
13oacar and Mary Handlin, Commonwea lth--A Stud1 ot 
ot the Role of the American Econom�, 1774 .. 1861 (New York: 
New Yo rk university Pres s ,  1947>, o. 
14King, Life ot King, I, 196. 
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must have changed his attitude because he acoepted the 
General Court ' s  •ppointment to go to Philadelphia in May. 
�rry • s  communication with James Monroe in the awnme� of 
1787 retleoted his concern about the conditions in the 
country. He wrote that unless "a system of Government is 
adopted b y Compaot, Foroe I expect will plant the Standards 
for· such an ana rchy as now exists cannot last long. nl5 
Actually Gertty was not specifically writing about Shays • a  
rebellion whioh had melted away but the general condition 
ot the oountry whic h  was filled with ruroore ot more revolts 
in different states. He wrote, 
Gentlemen seem to be impre s s ed with the 
necessity o f  establishing some ett1o1ent 
system and I hope it will se�ure us 
against di�estio a s  well a s  Foreign Inva sion • . 
Ir Gerry ' s  conversion over the revision of the Articles 
was �apid and somewhat aupapt1o1al ,  King ' s  conversion was 
g�adual and soul•aearahing. In hi s first years in Congres s ,  
King hed a n optimism about the republican qus lities ot the 
Articl e s ,  but a s  he began to �eoeive word about events in 
Ma s s achusetts ,  he became more skeptical about the adequacy of 
the Coofede�acy. "Wha t does all this mean ? K  he asked Gerry 
in August, 1786, when he heard about three county oonventions . 
"Are our Countiwymeo incapable of a tree Governmeot--or does 
all originate from the defect of the federal Constituti on? 1117 
15Ee st, "C:r1tical Peieiod , "  388. 
l7K1.ng, Lite gt Kins, I, 188. 
62 
King answered hie own questions when he wrote Theodore 
Sedgwioh, a Berkshire conservative, in October that "the 
great Body of the people a re ,  without Virtue, and not 
governed by any internal restraints of Conscience, there is  
too much reason to tear that the Framers ot our Constitution 
and r.ws ; have pl'Ooeeded on p�incipl•s that do not exist • •  • • 
King mixed both animosity tor the principles of the 
rebels with compassion for the tollowera ot the insurgent s .  
When King traveled to Boston in 1786 to make a report to the 
Legislature, he was appalled by the apath7 among the citizens 
and the ignorance ot the 198ders about the principles ot the 
rebels . In King• •  mind, the movement stood tor the abolition 
of all debts and equal distribution ot all property to all 
people . The aatet7 of the Commonwealth was in  jeopardy it 
the Government did not proTide a remedy-. The beat remedy in 
King ' s  Tiew was a peaoetul redress ot grievaDcea in  the next 
seaaion ot the Cou rt .
19 
He eonoeded that the state government 
may have pressed the subject ot d1 reot taxes "beyond what 
20 prudence would authorize . "  With the Court sitting, he 
hoped that i t  would r.dreaa the legitimate grievances or the 
21 people and establish the honor and energy ot government . 
Whi le General Linoolo was dispersing the rebels, King remal9ked 
to Gerry that he hoped minute attention would be paid "to 
nl8 
1�aat, "Critical Period , "  377-8 . 
19King, Litt ot King, II, 611•1) . 
21Austin, :g.prrz, II, 7-8 .  
20Ibtd. , I ,  190•1 . 
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eradicating every seed of insux-gency , "  yet punishment should 
be limited to leaders and not the "ignorant and mi agu1ded 
tollowere . "22 
From his position in Congress, King thought of �he 
revolt in his home atate exclusively i n  the context of state 
politic s .  Writing to Gerry, he stated that the distu rbaneea 
teated the authoritJ of the state government aod the state 
constitution . lie said tha t he felt more important in Co ngre ss 
because the authorities acted with "vigour and spiritn to 
repress the insurgency . 23 Whether King applied the situation 
in Massachusetts to a national level ia uncertain; nevertheless , 
his actions demonstrated tbat he was ready to cell for a 
revision ot the Articles . Other members i n  Congreaa noted 
that after the unrest in the atate, the Maaaachusetta 
delegation ( King, Gorham, and Nathan Dane ) was more triendly 
aod "looked upon toederal (!ii� assistance as a matter of 
great importance • • • •  "24 However, a n  obsel'V•r remarked that 
the delegation still "wished for a continuance of the 
Confederatioo . 25 
KiDg became increasingly concerned about the atate of 
national affairs also . I� Janua ry, 1787, he wrote Gerry: 
It is most certain that things will not long 
continue in their presant condition if foreseeing 
22Austin, Gtrty, II,  7-8 . 23Ibid. 
24Edmund C .  Burnett , The Continental Congress 
(New York: MacMillan Compan7, 1941), 67j. Hereafter cited as 
Bu rnett, Congres s .  
25Ibid. 
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the danger• which hang over u s ,  we do 
not unite in measures calculated to 
26 establish the public happiness • • • •  " 
King was referring to the threat ot ana roh7 and rebellion, 
and he warned Gerry to be caretul who Maesacbusetta sent 
to Philadelphia .  wThe times becoming critioal; a movement 
ot this nature ought to be care.fully obs•rT•d by eYery 
member o t  the community . n27 A month later, King thought 
things were burryi�g to a crisis. "Prudent and aagaoious 
men should be ready to seize the most favourable circum­
stanoee to establi sh a more perfect and vigol'Oua government.· " 
By Feb rua l"}", 1787, King was 1nolined to 1upport the Convention 
tor the revision ot the Article8 more •tor the purpose ot 
watching, than trom an expectation that muoh Good will flow 
from it. 28 When the report ot the Annapolis Convention oame 
up fo� debate on the tloor ot Congr$a s a rev daya later, 
Xing moved that C&Dgreae should call a oonv•ntion "tor the 
sole and exprese purpose for revising th• Ar-tioles ot 
Confederation • • • to ren4er the tedeMal Conatitution 
a dequate to the exig•oo•• ot governmen� and the pres•riration 
ot the Uoion . "29 Apparently King conceded on the �oint or 
letting a oonTention propose amendments to the federal govern­
ment and also on the point of calling tor • g•neral revi sion . 
26Austin, Gerrz, II , 3 -4 ·  
28Burnett, Letters , VIII, 541 . 
29King , Lite of King, I ,  204 .  
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Ilowever ,  King did not at this point support the Nationalistic 
progrom of eliminating the Artic les . The wording or his 
motion restricted the Convention to recommendi ng changes in 
the Articles rather than making alterations to form a national 
government . Whatever the product of the Convention, it still 
had to be approved by Congress a n d  submitted to the state 
legislature tor rati ficatio n . 
Another important factor which led to King ' s  change 
in attitude towsrd a convention was the action taken by the 
Massachusetts legi slature .  On Februa ry 22 the General Court 
approved the plan for the co nventi on by an overwhelming vot e . 
The Members were well at-iare that the westerners considered 
them anti-repub lica n .  The trend o f  opinion in  the United 
States was hostile to the dissolution of the Confederatio n . JO 
King hnd written to Gerry that "every man who wishes to 
strengthen the federal Government ,  and confirm the Union, is 
represented as unfriendly to the Liberties of the Peop le . "31 
Aft9r Shays 1 s  rebellion , financial interests took precedence 
over public opinioo . Masaaohusetts merobaots hsd a strong 
interest i n  the national debt because Massachusetts possessed 
about twenty percent of the federal debt . By l791 about 
$5, 0S5,000 was held by some 1 , 480 Massachusetts eitizen s .  
About seventy-three percent of thi s debt was i n  the hands o f  
about twelve percent o t  this g�oup who were mostly trom eastern 
towns , especially Bos ton . The Continental government had 
30King, Life of Ibing, I ,  137 . 3ltbi d .  
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i s sued loan oertifioates in 1780 to b�ing in revenue, but 
the certificates went instead to pay otf the debts or the 
a rmy ,  and thereby gravitated into the hands of the merchanta . 
Eighty percent ot the stat e ' s  s ha rs or the debt was held by 
merchants , b rokers , esqui?"es , and professional men most or 
whom were not the original holders of the federal debt . BJ 
1786 when New York and Pennsylvania were absorbing their 
share ot the net1enal debt , Ma ssaehusetta inflated state debt 
pl9evented her tl'eaaury from assUl11ing no moi-e than three 
percent of the state ' s  share ot the debt . 32 Before the 
outbreak or insurrection , the eastern seaboard interests had 
been eonfident that the state could rund both the state and 
national debta . When Ma seaehusetts ratified the impost or 
1783 , the state bad lodged a formal p retest against Congres e • s  
action of forcing "a l l  CPeditors to look to the central 
33 government �or payment. " But faced with the alternative o f 
limited o r  devalued payments in paper money, the commer c i a l s  
n ow  favored a convention .  Theodore Sedgwick wrote to King: 
Could we fund the public debt, which i s  our 
atat e 1 s  power, giving Security to the 
c redito r and a l levi a ti ng the burdens of 
direct taxation, we might prevent the 
vessel �he Confederatio.ii} in which we are 
at present embarked from going down until 
another was provided by the Philadelphia 
Convention • • • •  "34 
32Pergu so n ,  Power of Pur s e ,  69, 273-75 , 232 .  
33Ibid . ,  175-6. 
JliKing, Life of King, I ,  224. 
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Stephen Higginson i n  his letter to lienry Knox , the Secretary 
of We r ,  indicated that ai;:;rs ri c 11 rovol t had changed many 
minds i n  Massachusetts regaPding the "expediency of increasing 
the powers of Congress , n ot merely as to commercial Objects , 
but gene�e l ly . "35 He further £tated that the danger of 
s.ne rehy h a d  showed us "the neces sity of abri dgi ng the power 
of the �tetes to eontroul Gli�j o r  imp ede the measure� or 
the Union . "36 The oreditors ' interests wh1eh controlled 
the state house had to lo:>k to the central gove rnme nt to 
pay both the 9tate debt and the state ' s  sh.a re of the 
national debt . Therefo re,  Rufus YJ.ng retleoted this change 
of attitude in Massachusetts by supporting the oall ror a 
eonventi on to �evi se the A r t i e les . Undoubtedly his 
abhorance o:r s oc i a l  ra dica li sm represented by the ideology 
of Shays ' s  revolt and his skeptici sm about the adequacy ot 
the A�ticle� to meet the cri s i s  i n  national affairs 
facilitated his conversion too .  
3S01ett$rs of Higgi nson; " 743 . 36Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
Fitty-tour men with a variety ot backgrounds and 
exper1enoes met in Philadelphia to write the framework ror 
a national govei-nment in May, 1787 . Among these men were 
tour delegates t�om Massachusetts whose political thoughts 
aod actions had heretofore been largely Pegulated by the 
desires or thei� state . Now these delegates were a s suming 
a broader, national role which put them above the direct 
restraints or state insti-uotions . All had agreed that state 
and/or national events made it imperative that they strengthen 
the oentrel govePnment; otherwi s e ,  they would not have agreed 
to attend the o onvention. However, in the debates over the 
organization of the national government and the nature or 
the central government, to what extent did the delega tes ' 
experiences in their own state contribute to the constitu­
tional ideas whioh they expressed in the convection? 
Obviously, these men were also motivated by other complex 
intluenoes; neve rtheles s ,  this s tudy attempts only to 
co�relate state experiences with their constitutional idea s .  
Each man ' s  eont�ibutiona in the convention were varied and 
unequal, but on the whole, most ot theiP comments we�e 
related either to state experiences or to experiences had 
while serving their state in national attairs .  
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Elbridg• Gerry made the most comments ot any in the 
Massachusetts delega tion but his %9911ta rka seem to have been 
the lea st constructive as tar a s  influencing the end resul t .  
A t  times his opinions reflected an agrarian intluenoe; yet, 
he was so contound•d by the social revolution in Ma seachueetts 
that he tea red the excesses or democraoy. In some ca�ee his 
opinions were speoitioally favorable to mercantile-commereisl 
intere sts , but he a lso had en aversion to an a ri a tooretic 
tyranny. Gerry ' •  eoneiitutional ideas were • conglomeration 
ot revolutionary ideal• and ot middle class interea te . Be­
cause he orten changed his mind i n  the course ot debate e ,  his 
proposals were vacillating and contradictory. Appa rently, 
Gerey' was unsure wbieh ideology to support tor fear or 
losing popular favor . He att.-pted to t•k• a middle-or•the­
road attitude on a aubj •ct where there were rev alt•rnatives . 
In the end he refused to suppoi-t the Constitution on the 
basis that it wa s not democr1tic . Hie •xperiences in 
Massachusetts politic• ba d  shown him that the most popular 
ob.oioe was to support �•VC>lutionary republicanism. 
When John Randolph ot Virginia presented his plan tor 
a national goYeranent, Ger!"J appPOved or the three branch 
struoture because i t  was V•'l.7 similar to the Mas8achu!etts 
a rrangement . Although Gerry may have had a few doubts about 
the m$thod or change, he Toted with the ma jority to have a 
national government divided into three b�anches even though 
he had stated that this plan would annihilate the Confede�a tion . 
His ea rly empha s i s  in the Convention was in the method or change . 
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He was rel7!ng upon Congress to check any r•dioal change 
in the central gov•�nment. He stated that the distinction 
between "federal"  and r.oational" was not as important as  
pPoposing a stl"Ucture of goverllznent which would meet with 
the approval ot Congress .  The Massachusetts delegates were 
bound by their oommission to revise the Articles a s  were 
1 all the other delegate s .  
After Gerry approved the three branches of government , 
most of his comments centered on the strict separation of 
powers . Gerry, using his knowledge of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, beli•ved iD a system or checks and balances . 
When James Madison proposed the combining ot the executive 
and judicial branches into a Council of Revision, Gerry 
opposed th• idee £or several rea sons . Firet, he favored 
the Executive remaining a loot from the "seductive !ophistey 
ot the judge s , "2 The Executive would be more impa rtial it 
it  stood alone . Second, a combination ot the two branches 
was too strong ot a check on the Legislature. In Gerry ' s  
view, the Legislature would not enter into a contest against 
that powerful alliance . 3 The system of cheeks and balanoee 
proposed was similar in a rrangement to the Massachusetts • 
Constitution of 1780 . 
�rry ' s  tam111a rity with bis state ' s  constitution 
led him to propose some speoitic alterations to be �ade 
lFarrand, Records, I ,  42-J . 
)Ibid. ,  II,  78 .  
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within eaoh depa�tm•nt whioh came under disouaaion, tor 
inatano e ,  the judioia ry .  Th• 1truoture and role ot th• 
judicia'!"Y i n  GeJ.'917• s mind was to be very eimilar to th41t 
round in the Mas aachuaett constitution . Judgee were to 
sei-Ye as expositor• ot the law but could be called in by 
the other branches to give advice on the framing or the 
administration ot the laws . In the Convention Gerry said 
tha t he did not tavor judges setting themselves up e a  gua�dians 
ot the peOple by pa ss ing on the coostitutionality ot laws . 
From his viewpoint which was alao that ot the state ,, the 
legislature served to protect the rights · and interests ot 
the people. The judges merely explained the law. On s 
second idea concerning the appointment of judge s ,  Gerry ' s  
Tiew pa ralleled the structure inooPporated i n  his state ' s  
charter.  He favored the appointment of judges bJ tho enti re 
legislature rather than having only th� Senate confirm the 
nominations or the President . In Mas seohusetts judges were. 
ohosen by the Governor with the oonsent or the Council and 
the whole legi s lature . He gave two rea sons in the Conyention 
which demonstrated hia ability to reapply state exper1eno•s 
to a wider national scale·. Fil'st ,  the Executive and the 
Senate could not be well•informed on all men . Thi s illogical 
a rgument a ssumed that the more men involved in the choiee, the 
better informed the body wou ld be tor a oorreot decision . 
Gerry ' s  s econd argument was that the appointment b7 the 
President and the Senate did not give ''sati sfaction both to 
12. 
th• People and to the States"4 because the Senate was more 
biased towards state ' s  interests than towa�ds the people a e  
a whole . Experience with the western fal'mers protest about 
the laok ot popular will in the choice or judges obviously 
made Gerry cautious about supporting Senate -approved judge s .5 
Gerry ' s  ideas about the national executive were also 
based upon his knowledge or the Massachusetta constitution ot 
1780 . He knew that hie state bad one or t ile  most p owerful 
executives or all tho sta tes ; therefore, his p roposals never 
went furtheP than his state experiences. He did not favor 
giving the national executive unlimited powe r .  He opposed 
the absolute veto because he thought there was no need for 
this strict control over the l•gislature since it was oom• 
6 prised or the "bes t men of the oommuni ty . "  Ge�ry did 
tavor an executive veto whioh could be overturned by two-
thirds of both hous es ot the legislature. This latter 
a rrangement was taken from the government of the Commonwealth 
a s  was his proposal to add a council to the national 
executive . Although Gerry supported tho principle ot having 
a single executive , he suggested that a Council be annexed to 
the executive Hto give weight and inspire eon.tidenoe . "7 
4Farrand, Re2ords , II,  82 . 
5toid . ,  II, 74-5; Thorpe, Federel and State 
Constitutlobe , 1905-6. 
6Pta rrand, Reco rds , I, 98;  Thorpe, Federal and 
State Conatitutiogs , 1898. 
7Fa��and , �!92£48, I, 66; Thorpe , federal and st1te 
Constitutions ,  190 • 
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The Council oould advise the Executive and would be called 
into account for their opinions and impeached. Gerry ' s  
theory was that the Council was a "medi um through whieh the 
feelings of the people ought to he communicated to the 
Executive . ,,S 
One of the very b $ s t  examp les of Gerry ' s  transfer of 
state experience$ ont � a national scale ws a his final pro­
posal for the nomination and eleetion of the Presidect . A t  
fi rst he opp�sed the ele c ti on of the executive by the 
National Legis lature because he rea soned tha t ' . there would b e  
too muoh intrigue and ba rgaining with the legi sla ture to get 
good government . He suggested tha t electors should be 
appointed by national e lection districts . ':rlld state legis­
latures would nominate and the electors would ohoose the new 
Executive . Crerry eonoeded the flaw in his plan; popula r 
opin i on of the day would oot allow the states being s tripped 
of thei� powers . But h� confi dence in the people was so 
badly shak�n by 3hays ' s  revolt that he N 8 S  unclear what the 
role of the people should be in choosing electo rs ; in any 
ca s e he wa s utterly opposed to direct election becaus e he 
considered the pe�ple too uninformed snd too easily deceived . 
When the Convention set aside his p roposal for the state 
legislatures to nomi nate Electors , Ge rry moved that the s tate 
executives elect the ?resident . He rea soned th.at if the 
people cho s e  the tirst brsnch and the states chose the seoond 
8Farrand, Reco rds , I ,  70 -1 , 74. 
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bl'anch, the state governors should choose the national 
executive . He considered Governors beyond the intrigue ot 
the Na tional Legislature. This method also ofte rsd a strong 
attaoh."Ylent between state and na tional gove�nment , but it too 
wa s turned down b7 the eonvention. Tho final plan Geri-y 
presented on July 24th waa a carbon copy of the eleotion 
of the governor in Massachucett s .  He propos�d tha t the 
3tata legi a lo tur&s vote bj ballot for the P�sident in ?l'lO­
portion t� their state ' s  popula tion . It there wer� no 
ma jority eandidate,  the lower house �..n: s to �elect the two 
leading candidates and the Senate choose the President . 
In Ma r.saahusetts the peo-ple nominnted on the local levol , 
and  if n� person had a majority, the lowe r house by ballot 
would elect two out ot the four who had the highest numbe� 
of votes ,  a nd the upper house \·:ould choose the governo r .  
Although none o �  Ge rry ' s  ideas W$3 followed, he �ina lly 
supported the proposal for an Electoral College ; i t  at 
least kept the choice out ot the hands o f  the people . 9 
In the convention' s discussion about the make-up and 
election of the two houses of the nationnl l�gisl�ture, 
Gerry ' s  speeches refleoted the recent experien�eB in his 
state . Re could tolerate the election ot the lower house by 
the �eople if candida tes met eertai� conditions . Referl:'ing 
to Ma e s a chusett s ,  he reported tha t the evil� which the state 
9Pal'ftlnd, �ootfa, I ,  Bo ,  91 ,  17$-6; II, 100, 56-8, 
101, 105-6, 109 ; T(;rpe, Feder3l and �tate Constituti on s ,  
1900. 
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experienced had oome trom the excess ot democracy. "Th• 
people do not want vlrtueJ but a re dupes or pretended 
patriots . ulO The attaoks on the govermaent were too radical 
in his opinion . He telt that he had been taught th• "dang•r 
ot the leYeling sp1i-1t . •l1 As a solution Gerr7 advanced the 
idea ot election by the p•ople it the candidates bad to meet 
certa in p roperty qualit1cat1one so that the7 would be •men 
ot honor and charaeter. "12 The standards abould b• set high 
enough to exolude public �ebtors , a rm7 pensioners, and oon­
t�aetors . In GerPJ" ' s  Ol)inion proteoting PZ'OP•Pt7 was one 
object ot gove rnm•nt; theretope, setting up propePty 
13 restrictions could not be oonaidei-ed imp roper. 
Using Masaaohueetts •• an example, Oer17 p roposed that 
the Senate be oboa•n by the stat• leg1slatuPea . a. thought 
that the worst men got •lected to th• low•r house ot the state 
legislature becauae unrestricted surtrege let in the poor, 
the ei-1m1nal a ,  and the 1gnoi-ant . Reiterating the tact that 
he was against a ri atoorao7 and monarchy, h• ooaoeded that the 
t1P•t bl"8nch had to be tro• the peopl•1 but the second branoh 
should be made np ot men ot cba�acter and merit. 14 He stated 
that the mereantile iot•�•ata and stockholders would "be 
rep reeented if the state legialatures choose the second branch. nl5 
1°Fa rrand, Re2ords ,  I ,  48; II, 114 .  11Ib1 d . ,  I ,  48 . 
12ll?1d . '  50 , . 56 . l)Ibid . ,  125 .  
14Ibi d . ,  132 , i40 . 15Ibid . ,  154-5, 157 · 
76 
O.rry aasum•d that the people had two gr•at interesta-·land 
and money. Moat ot the people made up tb.e l•nded interests 
and opposed the coanei-oial and monied interest11 hence,  
Gerry felt that the atate legislatures Whioh favored th• 
meroantil& ola s s  WGuld be the best electorate tor the 
Sem te •16 Gerry also a ssumed that the upper houses ot the 
state legislatures would balance the evils round io the 
popula rly-elected lower houses . Gerry' s insistenoe upon 
p roperty qualifications tor otticeholding 1� both branches 
stemmed from his knowledge or the Massachusetts constitution . 
The state charter stated elections were tree it the people met 
the propePi:y qualitications and ottioeholdePs had to have 
three pounds annual inoome to be members ot the House and six 
pounds to be membe�s ot the Senate. Gerry had used both bis 
experience and his personal obeervations to justify property 
i-equi rements tor national otrice holding .17 
The critical question ot repre8&ntation to the Senate 
caused a great deal ot tirustttation in the oonv.ation and in 
Gerl:"Y' ' s  mind . Like most New Englanders , Gerry ravo�ed pro• 
portional �•presentation in the upper house.  It the la rger, 
wealthier states auoh • •  Maasaohuaett� were to b• a ssessed 
direct taxes on their inhabiifan�a,  . they should have a propor­
tional voice in governm•nt .  He vas not i n  favor ot states 
having an equal vot·• beoauae he conoluded that this principle 
1893, 
16Par1'8nd, Regords, I, 1$2. 
17112.1.f. , 467;  Thorpe, Ff�tral and stet! C9n1t1tutions , 
1896� 
11 
fuld been one of the great weaknesses or the Conted•ration . 
Gerry bad to violate his anti-Federal views at thi s point 
aod use nationaliatio a rguments to put aaross the validity 
ot his oase. He oPitioiz•d and condemned the states •nd their 
advoeates for being "intoxio•t•d with the 14•• ot their 
sovereignty. "18 He a rgued that the states were not or 
n•ver could be independent states accoi-ding to principles of 
the Cont9derat1on. Aocording to Gerry th•7 had only corporate 
rights . The a7at9111 of govel't111ent was inadequate because some 
small states abused their power. He stated, •confederations 
are a mongrel kind ot govePmnentj and the world does not 
19 attord a preoedebt to go b7. "  Gerry chaired the Grand 
Committee whioh worked out t!ut cmaproinise between large and 
small state intel'!8at1, but he was not d1reotl7 r•aponsible 
tor the eventual comp1'01D1ae. The Senate was to hav• an equal 
numb•r or rep resentatives trom each state, but a s  a concession 
to the l• rs• atat• • •  ell revenue bill8 were to originate in 
the lower house and the Senate oould onl7 approve or d1 8approve . 
Ge�ry was reluctant to support the oompl'Oll1ae eTen though the 
arrengement was • ooncess1oo to the la rge states and vae 
similar to • pi-oYision in the Mas saehusetta constitution. 
Un4oubte417, hi• pl'i .. 17 . motiYe was to pl'Ot•et the •conomic 
interests ot his oonstituenta by being unoo11pro•i 1ing. He did 
think that making the revenue bills the exclusive right of 
the lower house made "it a constitutional principle that the 
19p:>i d . , 474, 479. 
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second branch L�•n•t� were not possessed of the Confidence 
of the people in money matters . whioh would lessen their 
weight and influenc e . "  20 
After the �epresentative compromi s e ,  Gerry worked 
tor two basic pr1n1ciples--states • rights and mercantile 
interests . After the Committee on Detail presented their 
report . Gerry repoPtedly was shocked at the to� o t  national 
government which he had agi-.ed to i n  the deba tes .  Whether 
he had reactions ot eonsoienee against what he bad done 
cannot be document•d sutt1ciently. but eventually he would 
x-ejeot the document after a ttempting to amend i t  i n  the 
later days ot the Convention. 
Gerry was violently opposed to a standing a rmy in 
peace tim&. He tavo�ed volunteer militia which would take 
orders from local commanders rather than from national 
generals . His reco?'d in Congress demonatMtted that he 
thought the militia was the la s t  resort of liberty and that 
21 a i-agulai- a my wa s the tir8t instance of coercive tyranny. 
Western Mas8achusetts held the same opinion because in 
Octob9r, 1786, Geri-y vrote King tht t some ot the •country 
members laugh and say the Indian wa r i s  only a political 
one to obtain a standing a rmy . "22 During an August day 
ot the Con•ention, Gerry debated the •vil ettects ot a 
20 Farrand, Bteord1, I, 545. 
21surnett, Lettera, VII, 604•5. 
22King, L6tt ot �pg, I, 197. 
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standing army. He proposed that there be a limit ot two o r  
three thousand troop s .  The plan was defeated and ao th.is 
attempt by Gerry to p rotect the states from tbe ooeroive 
powe� of the central government tailed. 23 
Gerry wa1 most succeastul in p rotecting the interest 
of his state by p rohibiting the taxing ot exports . He was 
atrenuousl7 against tbe national legislature having the power 
to tax exports because he thought that it would be used to 
compel states to grant new powers to the geaeral government . 
He stated �hat "we have given it more power already than we 
koow how will be exercised. It will enable the General 
Government to oppress the States ,  a s  muoh as I reland is 
opp ressed by Great Britaia . "24 
Be1ides protecting states • interests in oommerce, 
Gerry in the latter days of tn. Convention worked to pr-ovide 
a return on public seourities . As a merchant, Gerr7, a s  well 
• •  his oonstituenta in Maaaaohusetts , had i�veated i n  gov•rn• 
ment seourities .25 On August 18 he urged aome p roTision be 
made in the Constitution tor public securities. His specitic 
recommendation was tbat the new government had the obligation 
to redeem the public debt even though tbe loans bed been made 
under the Confederation. It a plan for redemption were not 
included, there would be great opposition to the document. 
He pleed9d that states such as Massachusetts which bad tried 
23Farrand, Rooords, II, 329-30 . 24Ibi d . ,  362. 
25The reader will recall that the interest from 
government bonds would almost pay Gerry ' s  taxes . Chapter I .  
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'o tund their debts be given speoial consideration. He was 
tea rful - that they would be oblig•t•d to �•7 More than their 
sha re on other state s •  debts . Gerry desi red to traoater the 
oonaer•ative monetary polic1 ot bis state to ;be national 
level . Oliver Ellsworth, a Nationalist from Connecticut, 
later charged Gerry with working to get th• na tional govern­
ment to redeem Continental notes at par value. Th• reoords 
p�ove that GePry had said nothing as speeitic as that but 
the subject probably had orossed hi s  mind .26 
Towa �d the conolus ion ot the Convention, Gerry ' s  
opposition to the propose d  Consti tution became stronger 
until finally _ he refused to sign th.e document . In his tirat 
epeeeh rejecting the Constitution, Gerry enrpb.e sized that a 
possible ciYil va r  might erupt o••r l'atitioation. He thought 
the plan went too tar because the experiment dec�ea sed the 
power ot the states tor the sake of the national goYernnsent .  
Since mo·st people i-egai-ded the state a s a pieoteotoie of thei r 
democratic liberties, theZJe would be • conflict wi th those 
who supported a vigorous government.27 Hi s  later objections 
were calculated to appeal to the anti-Federal tamer. He 
felt that the rights of the citizen were not aeoure for the 
followi ng reasons . First, the elaetio olauae gave too much 
general power to the Legislature. Second, the national 
26Fa rra nd, Record s , II, 326, 356, 377, 413; III,  
i10-2 , 259-60, 239.4a. 
27Ibid . ,  I I ,  386, 388 . 
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government could rai s e  an al'my and money without constitutional 
limitations . Thi rd , courts were established without juries . 
To remedy thes e essential dateet s ,  Ge rry proposed a second 
convention . 28 In his r ep ort to the Massachusetts legislature, 
Gerry ' s  p ri ncipa l ob jection wn s ,  rather i ronically, tti...a t there 
was no t adequate provisi on for repre�entatioo of the peopl e . 
Other ob j ectionB were that the powers ot the L�gi slature 
were ambiguous , the Executive blenced wi th the l.egislature, 
the Judiciary was oppressiv e ,  and there wa s no Bill of Right s .  
This last obj ection was significant to hi s Massachusetts 
constituents because the state constitution had thirty pM>• 
vi sions in the Decla rati on of Rights to protect their interest s .  
To justify his participation in the Convention, Gerry stated 
that the Convention had gone beyond i t s commi s s i o n .  Because 
he hed wanted a more efficient gove rnment , he went along 
with the majority during the proceedings . He conceded that 
the amending of the A rti cl e s would have proved difficult 
too . "The Consti tution proposed has few i f  any federal 
29 
feature s ;  but i e  rather e system of national gcvernme n t . " 
Gerry concluded that the document had great meri t  i f  i t  could 
b e  amended to preserve liberty. JO 
Whe reas Gerry • e  brittle republicanism borde red on the 
ca lculating a e  he appea red to be playing to the political 
galle ries Q Nathaniel Gorham ' s  c onsti tutional idea! were 
28 Farrand, Reco rd s ,  II. 632-3 . 29 Ibid • •  128-9 .. 
30Aus tin , Ge�rz, II,  42·3 · 
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ext remel7 praotioa l .  Gorham applied his Ma ssachusetts 
experiences ,  eepeci a ll7 those wbi oh he had had working 
with the st•'• ' s  constitution. Chosen the presiding cha i r •  
man o f  the Committee o f  the Whole , Gorham was able t o  p ropose 
comprom i s e s  d�awo from his knowledge �f Ma s s a chusetts p ol i t i c s . 
He s e rved on the Committee of Detail which cons olidated the 
ideas p roduoed i n  two months �f deba t e . Although d�oumente 
a re n o t  available, Go�ham could have exerted s s t rong influ-
enoe ln determining the � t ructure a nd powers of the new 
government . Go�ham S?oke few times i n  the Convention; yet 
each speech d�ove to the core ot the p roblem, and more often 
than n o t ,  he conoluded his a rgumenta by quoting s ome obs e rvations 
from Ma s s a ohus et ts ' experience . 
Du�ing hi! tenure of office in the Continental Congresa, 
Gorham d e s i r� d  a more efficient government . The key t o  the 
p r oblem of the Confede ration i n  hi:1 op i n i o n ,  was the p rinciple 
of rep�es enta tion and voting. In March, 1786, he wrote to 
James War�en, a MBssachusetts lawyer, that he wa� perple�ed 
by the inattention and negligence of the s t � t es to a ttend 
Congre s s . The baeis of the p roblem was that all state$ were 
consi der&d equal i n  the Confe�ere tion . There was no rea son 
for the small states t o  have the same weight in national 
affa i rs as the la rge s ta te s . Re thought that "if the repre­
sentation had been apportioned according to numbers o r  p roperty, 
a n d  a suitable quo rum established a nd the ma j o rity vote to 
determine questions, thi s i n a t tention would not exist � "32 
31Bu�nett , Lette r s ,  VII I ,  317 -8 . 
8) 
Go rham defended this philosophy i n  the course of the 
Conve cti on, especia lly i n  the dehate ove r proportional 
representation to the upper hou�e of Congre s s . Ar. suming a 
tough policy against the smal l  states , he felt that i f  large 
states would consolidate on oommon p rinciples of government , 
the sma l l  states would be forced to follow out ot economic 
necessity. If the Union broke ape rt , the large states would 
be able to me1nt•in order w1 thin themselves . Therefore, he 
urged that weak states and st�ong �tates c on solida te into a 
union, much a s  Ma s sa chusetts was a n  i ncorporation of three 
colonies , old Massaohusetta, Plymouth, snd Mai n e .  "All 
pa rtie! we�e sere a nd satisfied; every distinction is now 
fo �gotten . "32 Getting to the ma in point o r  hi s a rgument, 
Gorham stated that • uni on of st�tes wa s necessary for the 
happines s of everyone and a ti rro, general goTernment wa s 
neces sa ry for their union . 33 
However, Go�ham wa s not infle�ible on the s ub j ec t  or 
rep resentation, esp eoia lly when a eomp �omi se was need ed to 
save the union. When Go rham saw that the small states would 
not a ooept a doownent i n  which the l• rge sta tes had a g reater 
influence i n  the nati ona l gove�nment than they be d ,  he �poke 
in favor of the compromise p�esented by the Grand Committe e .  
To justify his oha nge o f  cours e , h e  cited a oaae i n  the 
Ma s e e ehusetts constitution in which the rep resentatives in the 
la rger �1 �tr1ots were not "in e n  exsct ra tio or thei r 
32Farrsnd, Reco rds , I, 462-J . 
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oumbers . n3
4 
He said that experience had shove this 
"proTi sion to be expedieot "35 io satisfying most ot the 
counties of the state . 
The Massachusetts constitution p rovided that all 
state officials be elected annually, but Gorham di sagreed 
with this idea on the national level. In the lower house ,  
he saw that the "great bulward of our liberty was i n  the 
frequency or elections, and tbeir great dangera i s  the 
36 septennial parliaments . "  Nevertheles s ,  wh•n the question 
ot Senatorial terms caused a general a rgument in th• Convention, 
Gorham jett�aoned the theory of annual elections and p roposed 
six year terms tor Senators with one-third being elect•d 
37 eve�y two 1ears . 
Go rham i n  bis discussions demonstrated that he 
favored a reduotion in the states ' powers . He suggested each 
state have two represen\at1vea to the upper house because 
"the streng'h ot the general Government will lie not in the 
largeness but in the smallness ot the Statea . "38 He pre• 
dieted that the number ot states would be inoreased by 
western expansion and that large s tates would be s epa rated. 
He wa s not as apprehensive about the size a nd influence ot 
states as Ger17 because he believed that the general govern­
ment would be stronger it the states were smaller. As an 
34Farrand, Be2ords, 
.36Ib1d . ,  381 . 
38Ib1 d . , II, 94. 
I ,  404·5 ·  
37tb1d. , 421, 430 . 
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example ot state separation he used the proviooe or Maine 
39 which was holding a convention to separate trom Maaaaohuset t s .  
While Gorham was a delegate to the Continental Congres s ,  
he had jealously guarded the erosion or federal powers by the 
state goTermnent while inoiteasing the power ot the central 
goyernment .4° He was against parting with a power o f  Congress 
whioh someday might be used against Congre a a . Probably a s  a 
�•ult 0£ Shays • s  rebellion, Gorham taYored the general 
government haying the right to intervene in a rebellion with­
in a single state.
41 
Be alao believed that the national 
goYernment should aettle disputes between statea . 42 
Oonnne�ce wae one i a•ue upon whioh Gorham ' s  desire to� 
a strong, national goYeroment o••rlapped with the primary 
interest ot his const1tuenoy. He bluntly stated in the heat 
ot the diaousaion o•er national regulation of commerce that 
the 9astern interests attended the convention not tor their 
aatety but to guarantee thei� commerc e .  He said that they 
did not tear externa l dangers nor did they ne•d tne aid ot 
Southern states .  He reminded the delegates that the "Eastern 
States had no motive to Union but a commercial one . "43 In a n  
39Pa rrand, Recorde , I ,  540 . Gorham was not bothered 
by the contradictory use ot Maine a s  an exalllple for both the 
uniting and the separating ot states . See p .  BJ, n .3 2 .  
4°Hunt, Writi98! ot Madison, I ,  )63 . In 1783 Gorham 
opposed states chOoaing .ooaaittee s  to valuate lao4 which 
would be taxed to pay ott war quota s .  
41Parrand, RtooJ1s, I I ,  48 . 42B>i�. ,  405. 
43Jb!d . ,  II, 374. 
86 
appa rent attempt to aotten Southern opposition en th• issue 
ot commeroe and to make way fop a comp?t011i••• Gorbam atated 
that it the new government did not relieve the situation in 
the conmuu•oial states by baTing the pow•P to "strict foreign 
trade and regulate inte•state oomme?'Ce, the oommeroia l states 
bad no reasons to Join the union . He wa rrred the Southerners 
that they would have the most reason to dread · di sunion 
because the middle and eastern ststes wer• mare able to 
�roteot themselves .44 
Beeauee Massachusetts had a tairl7 autocratic 
constitution , Go rham used a state example to strengthen his 
case tor a strong natioaal government . Cop1fng the Ma asachusetta 
experienoe, he preferred that the judges be appointed b7 the 
Executive with 'he a dvice and oonsent ot the second branch of 
Oongrsss rathe� th.an the whole legi slature . He said that this 
wa s the method apptto•ed b7 one hundred and tor�y yeiars ot 
•xparienoe in Massachusett s .45 Ho beli•�ed that the loweP 
branch was "too aumerous and too littl9 Ntaponsible to ensure 
a good choi�e • ..11.6 In hi s view, "legislatu�ea , whioh repre• 
sented the peopl• , gaTe tull play to int�igue and eaba1 . n47 
EVidently Gorham believed that hi s state had founded a strong 
judiciary which was removed r�o� the influence ot tha people. 
Go�ham bad enough political understanding to know that 
it the nationa l government wa s given too many powers , the 
44Far,...nd , R199rd 1 ,  II, 453 . 
46Ib\d. , 215-6. 
45· 
!bid· , 43.4. 
47Ibid . ,  44 .  
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people would not agree to the Constitution . Oae coaoeaaion 
which he left to the states was the privilege of establishing 
voter qualification. When pressed on the subject, he thought 
that reetriotions written into the Constitution would be 
impolitic . Merchants and manufacturers wh.o . benetitted by 
prope rty qual1tications would be pu.t in  an unfavorable posi­
tion . Many people , esp·ecially mechanics io tb.e New England 
cities , had long been accustomed to the right ot voting. 
Gorham concluded that an abridgment or this right would 
probably mean the rejection of the Constitut1oc by the fre•­
holders .48 As another concession to the New Englanders, 
Gorham urged a plan familiar to Massachusetts dealing with 
meetings . Gorham tavored a fixed time tor national meetings 
in the Constitution . His reasons were that at leaat one 
meeting a year was needed to check the Executive branch, and 
that disputes within the legislatures and between the states 
would be avoided . Drawing another example trom the state ' s  
experience , he stated that "the annual time of meeting had 
been long fixed by their Charters and Constitution s ,  and no 
inconvenienoy had resulted . "49 Since separate ballots for 
the elections of state officers had been used in Massachusetts , 
Gorham suggested a joint ballot on the nntional level so a s  to 
do away with some of the inconvenience and oonrusion found at 
state levei .5° 
48Farrand, Record s ,  II, 215. 
50ibi d .  
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Gorilam • a  dedication to creatibg a national gove.-nment 
lett him t•w oono•aaiona � give to th.e atatea .  When �he 
question waa raised about who ehOnld ra tifJ' cbe Conet1�ution. 
ha e.xp>."essed Plore oonfide.QOe in conventions tban in the etate 
legislaturea . Obviously , he believed that the Federalists 
oauld control the cobventiona better than the atate legi•­
lature s .  3-sidea, oon�entiooa ha d  been us� auooeas1'1ll7 in 
Massachusetts to ohange and to ratify o•v trameworoka or 
government . New Eraglaadere faYO�ed conTeosiona becauee they 
were the originato�s of big�� law, that ia, above the uau1 l 
lega l p rocess . He preaentoa aeveral reaaona whieb demonstrated 
hia p�litical understanding of th• national aituatioa. Fi rst, 
lle believed men eleeted bf the people to• the pur-poae ot 
ratif7ing ta. doow..nt �ould be more oandid than legialators 
-ho had to watch out tor tbei� jooa. SeooDd. be knew that i t  
was more difficult to get a resolution through two branches 
or a legislature tbag one e>ODTention . Thi i-ct ,  in man7 states 
some qualif1$d men ..iould b• uoluded from the legialature. 
Gorham iirlas rete:rr1ng to the olergy vhom b.e oonaideNd to � 
"tr1ends ot good governmant , "5l He conn•nted tbat tbai� 
$erv1oes had been valuable in the to:matioD ot the Maaaaohuaetts ' 
Coostitutioo . Fourth, Gorham tb.ougbt tbat state l•gialatuNa 
could dela1 the issue ot retitication and frustrate the 
national system. I.aat, GQrha111 teai-ed that one atate might 
itefuse to ratify tb.e Constitution . To prevent thia problem 
he faTored implementing the national system whi le waiting ro� 
51 
FarNnd, Rtgords, II, 90. 
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unanimous appi-oval by the atates . 52 Gorham ohv�ouely was 
a dsdioated supporter of a s trong central government whose 
tle�ible and prao tioa l attitude in the Convention helped 
create a document which reflec ted the interests of his own 
state. 
Hore than any other Mass achus etts delega te, Rufus King 
favored a s tro ngly centralized national governmen t .  With his 
marriage to the daughter of a New York mercha n t ,  King had 
joined a social and politioal world different trom the one 
he had known in Massachusett s .  He .fell under the intluenoe 
of Alexander Hamilton and was converted to Hamilton ' s  anti• 
Confederation views in the ea rly pert of 1787. Hamilton 
observed to a friend, "I have revolutionized hi s  m1nd . n5J 
Most of King ' s  oontact with bis Mas sachusetts constituents 
were by lettel:' after he was elected a member of the Second 
Continental Congress in 178h. After his ma rriage in 1786, 
hi s wife demanded tha t he �tay in New York rather than return 
to Boston . However, YJ.ng made a few trips to New England to 
meet with the legislature . A t  the Philadelphia Convention he 
apologized fol:' not knowing the views or hi s constituents on 
many sub jects considered . In 1787 he cha nged his residence 
to i:ew York, but returned to Boston to help win the rRtitieation 
battle i n  the s ta te conventio n .  
· 52Fa rrand, Reoorda , II, 90 . 
53King. Life ot King, I ,  203 . 
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Most ot King ' s  commente at Philadelphia were influenced 
mol'e by his e.xperienoe in the Congress than his Ma a saohusetts 
experience s .  At firat, he had fear�d che ttse ot a convention 
to amend the federal Artiol•• • but once oonvinced the Articles 
of Contederation needed to be changed, he rationalised the 
use of a eoDvention.54 The basis of his objection to the 
Confederation waa the aovereigcty of the states. He believed 
that states were not sovereign because they did not possess 
the power to make war, peace, treaties, and allianoea. King 
reasoned that Congress acted with and without inatruetions 
by the states. When the atates had rol'med the Confederation, 
they also formed a nation. Even though the atatea ha d  re­
tained some portion of their sovereignty� they had given up 
the essential pa•t•• If Congress oould propose cbangea by 
using the last p�oviaion or \he Article•• the oonvention 
delegated by Coog�•ae could deliberate and p�opose any 
al tel'ations . 55 
One essential part ot King • s  concept of the national 
government waa tbe reduction of the powers of the states. 
Instead of eliminating the states as other Nationalists 
desiPed, King thought that much of their preaent power could 
be transferred to th• oent1'9l government.56 The states would 
54aurnett, Letters. VIII, 4B8-9. FoP example• KiDg 
vaa aware of the orltloal beed for teder.l revenue and wrote 
to Gerry in October. 1786. pleading w1 th him to "Imp pe s s  
upon the minds or our monied triends the indispensable 
necessity ot a Loan of monies • • • •  n 
55Farrend, R190£41. I. 323·4· 56Ib1a. , .324. 
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be prese�vod but in a subol'dinate role t and their rights would 
be secured in a national constitution.57 King felt that the 
states had had too muoh influence in t�1e Confederation. In 
Congress the delegates had been subservient to the views of 
the state rather than to the general interest because the 
atate had elected them.58 King believed the p roposed 
Constitution would mean mo�e ooutact with the individual 
citizen than with the s tate. In the arguments over whether 
the Senate should b& based upon proportiona1- �epresentation 
or not , King said the Confederation was an example of the 
principle of s ta te equalit7 and he feared that this facade 
ot state sovereignty was sacrificing the rights and happiness 
or the whole people. He waa ama zed that a government based 
upon fair representation of the people should be renounced 
for a n  attacbt:!ent to an ideal of the importance of the 
state s . 59 Once a new government was e s tablished, King 
believed that the general government would not interter� 
60 with the process of atate governments .  Yet when asked 
specifically about what rights aod powers would be given to 
the state by the national governmant, · Ki ng • s  proposals were 
ambiguous and contradictory. For example, be stated that the 
vice of the Con£ederation had been too much legislation, most 
of which he felt rightfully belonged to the states. He 
envisaged the national legislature discussing only revenue and 
commGroe. 61 
57Fa rrand, Records ,  I ,  492. 
59Ib1d . ,  492•3: 489-90. 
58Ibid. , 359-60. 
6lib1d. , 198. 
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It King ' s  idea about the rol• ot th• states was 
unclear, bis oonoept or the executive vaa very distinct. 
He desired a stronger .xecut1v• than round in the govern­
aent of his state. He tavored an Executive who would hold 
ottioe on good behavior. but he later conceded that the 
Chief Magiatrrate should serve a limited time but be eligible 
tor reelection. The Executive would be tried periodically 
b7 his eleotoi-s according to how well be performed his 
duties . The electors had exolusive power to remove him 
trom office. Kicg believed that he ahould not be impeach­
eble by the Legialatur• because this would Jeopardize the 
62 Exeout1ve • 1  iode�•nd•noe. King • s  p ropoaal tor an ar1sto-
•l'8tic ex•outive vaa det .. t•d• but the pl'Opoaal demonstrated 
that King was &111J>athet1o with Alexander Hamilton who bad 
tavored a similar arrang•ent earl7 in the Convention. King 
oontinued to vork to• a strong executive vh1oh he thought 
vea needed to giye the oount17 s tab111t7 and order. 
How would the Preaident be nominated end elected . ?  
At til'st. King approved ot Ger17• s p ropos•l whiob was taken 
trOll the Com•onwaalth'a Const1tut1on• that is. the state 
legislature vould nominate the candidate. the lower house 
63 select the two l .. d1og candidates, the upper house eleot. 
�n th• other delegates overwhelmiogly deteat.d this idea, 
King objected to the alternative pz-oposal that the President 
be ohoeen by the National Legislature because he believed 
that a large state oould contl'Ol the election ot one ot its 
62Farrand1 Records , II, 66·7· 
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candidates. The only recourse lett io King ' s  mind was a 
compromis e  plan by which. the presidential electors would be 
chosen by the people at large.64 The final solution was th& 
Eleotoral College which 1nool'Porated K1ng • s idea to provide 
tor an 1ndireet election of the P�sident by the people. 
King believed in a sepa ?lation ot branches aod a system 
ot checks and balances. both round in th• Massao.husetts 
Constitution; however. 1b the course ot the pitoceedings he 
attempted to strengthen tM Senate and the Presidency at 
the expense or the lower house. King had seconded a motion 
by Ger17 giving the Exeoutive the right to Teto legislation 
which could be ov•rridden by two-thirds of both houses of 
the legislature. Thia ar�angement paralleled that in the 
Massachusetts Ooostitution; howevel', late in the Convention. 
King moved to strengthen the Execut1ve t s  veto by p roposing 
that three•fourtha vote ot both houses vould be needed to 
o·ve.rride the veto. 65 This measure tailed; nevePtheless, 
K1n.g continued to work to1! •n a ristocratic go•ernment. 
Several days later he pl'oposed to weaken the love� house and 
strengthen the upper house. A�ter obse?'Ving the revolt in 
Ma s eaehusette, King telt that the lower house was "governed 
too mueh by the passions ot the moment. • • • One a s s embly 
would have hung all in.aurgenta in that stateJ the next was 
9<1ually diS})osed to pardon th•. "66 To gi'Ye more stability 
64Farrand, Records, I I ,  109. 
66Ib1d. ,  I I ,  62.6-7. 
65Ibid. , I ,  98; II� 586-7. 
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to the Legi elsture, King favored six-year tei-ms tor Senators 
because longer terms meant mor:-e "judgment and deliberation 
for businees ot govercmeot especially foreign treatiea . 967 
He did aeo the neoesai ty of annual meetings ot the legis• 
lature until the iasuea ot commerce and revenue were settled. 
Then he saw no need tor oontioued sessiona . 68 
King' s  ba31o concern throughout the Convention was 
that the national gove�nm•nt should haTe enough power, 
especially in fiscal policy, so a s  not to be dependent upon 
the stetes . King bad ob1erved in the Continental Congress 
the futility of the requisition system in raising enough 
reYenue to pay ott the roreign and domestic debt . He had 
also worked for an impost which would haYe giv•n Congress a 
limited taxing power only to see the proposal go down to 
deteat two times because one state refused to make approval 
unanimous. In the Convention King p roposed that the 
national legislature make ite own appropriations to meet 
69 the expenses ot the central govermuent. HoweTer, he was 
reluctant to give the national legi slature power to levy 
both aD export and import tax tor fea r that they might 
interfere with manufactures in some states, especially 
2nd 
in the Several 
ompany, , 
cited aa Eliot, D!bates . · 
68Farrand, Reoords, I I ,  198 .  
69Ibid . ,  I,  196; I I ,  442 .  
Massachus etts . He agreed to a revenue impost because it 
would not restrict Massachusetts comme ree. 70 
Because Massachusetts had a vital concern in the 
payment of the public debt, King wa s the rirst of tbe state 
delegation to raise the idea that the national government 
assume and pay oft the app roximately $70 , 000 , 000 states ' 
debts . He noted that state creditors were the strongest 
foes of the plan to tax imports on a national level because 
they £eared the loss or state revenue which was used to pay 
off state bonds . These men would probably oppose the 
Coostitution said King i f  the state debts were not transferred 
along with the best souroe ot tax revenue .71 In the end the 
Constitution was si lent on the matte� though King ' s  mentor, 
Hamilton, carried through the scheme io Washington ' s  
adminietration . 
King agreed with his tallow delegates that state 
conventions were tne method tor ratifying the new govern• 
men t .  State legislatures were legally the correct body, 
but practical polities had taught King that conventions 
oould be manipulated m�re easily .  Legislature s ,  being the 
on8s to lose power, would most likely have more objections 
than the peop l e .  The general public never had any power and 
�1ould not be concerned about which government ruled them . 72 
The convention method was the mos t efficient way to get 
around the legal restrictions of the "old" Constitution ; yet, 
70 Farrand, Record s ,  I ,  196; II, 442 . 
71 8 72 Ibid . 1  I ,  6-7 , 327- • Ibid . ,  12 - 3 .  
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i t  would orrer ths people a voi�e i n  the new Constituti on . 
King distrusted the people but reali zed they were more 
malleable than thirteen 8tate legislatures . 
Caleb �tr�ng , i n  the words o t  one historian, was an 
18th cen tury Calvin Coolidge .73 P� s comments in the 
Convent i o n  were short and spa r s e .  On the whole he stuok 
to a form of Mg s sa dhusetts republicanism ;  yet he wa s  willing 
to compromise when he though national interest took prece­
dence �Ve?" sta te interests . For example·,. Strong favored 
the electi on of the first brnnoh or the national legi slature 
by the people i n  annual el ection s . He stBted tha t ,  "The 
fixed habit throughout our country • • •  is in favor or 
annual �leetions . "74 In the state ratification oonvsntion, 
Strong rep orted that biennial elections were the b e s t  ar�nge­
ment whi c h  the state ' s  delegates oould get at the time . Many 
&tates had de si red more than two yea rs ; therefore ,  by 
eoncession a nd oomp rom1s e , the term wa s fixed to make i t  
agreeable with South Carolina . The s outhern states desi red 
longer terms because .the expense i n  "more frequent elections 
would be grea t . "75 · 
Strong ' s  belief in annual slections a l so tonehed the 
Senate and the Presidency. He opp o s e d  a seven-yea r term to� 
the Executive76 a �  well as a s even-ye a r  term tor Senato�� . 77 
73MaoDonald, E, Plpribus Unum, 163 . 
74Parrand, R•eol"da , I ,  361 . 75Ib1d. , III, 247. 
76� . , II, 72 . 77Ib1d. , 219 . 
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Although he failed to speoi.t'y what length or term he would 
suppo rt , the principle of frequent elections was part ot 
the Massachusetts beritege, and St �ong echoed them by 
desi ring shorte r terms for the two "a ristooret1o11 office s .  
The separat ion ot br-a nohe s ·was a n  important p a rt of 
Stronc ' s po11 t1. cal phi l osophy as !.t wes the other delegates 
from h i s  stat e .  He eg�eed with Gerry "that the powe� or 
mek:tnr; ot�ght to be kept distinct from truit of ex-pounding the 
laws . "78 ·when the i dea of combining the J'ud1ciery and the 
Executi va 1.n a oounoil of revi �ion we s made by J'atnes Madison , 
Strone stated that "no maxim was better establi shed" than 
79 removing the judges from the inf luenee or .framing the lllw. 
The r.fa s s aehusetts constitution of 1780 provided for the 
three separate brsnohes and Strong reflected this a rrangement 
in making the judgee sepa rate from other parts of the 
governm ent . 
Strong, who b�d no �xperience i n  the Continental 
Conzres s >  favored a oon�titutional limitation on the salary 
of Coneressmen . Re p roposed that the national gove rnment 
pay up to �t� .00 a day ond .expenses of traYe l to snd from 
Con�ress.80 The states would make additions beyond that expens e .  
Thi e cot?Tp�mise a rrangement between state and central govern­
ment would meke i t  possible t'or the state to have some control 
or their delegates while e t  the same time, the national 
7BFarrand, Records , I I ,  75. 
Bo Ibid . ,  II, 29) . 
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government would not be totally dependent upon the states 
to get their representatives to serve their term s .  Mo�e 
important, the Maaeaotwsetta Constitution provided that 
delegates receive 0017 tPavel expenses and salai-iea were to 
be paid by the local towaa. 
On July 24, Strong agreed with the poai ti on ot Gerry 
and King in that the Exeoutive should be chosen by the 
national legislature ic an a�ra ngement similar to that found 
in the Meseachusetta instrument ot gover?J1Dent . In answering 
attacks upon his position, Strong showed that be believed 
the Executive should not be ineligible to return to ottioe 
• second time because eleeting a new legislature would take 
place between the t1rat and aeoond swointmente . StPOng 
did not think that there would be any great d•pendence or 
the Ex•cutive on the legislature for re-election which could 
destroy the syetem or checks and balances between the two 
branches . tfnlike King, however, Strong refused to accept 
the idea or electors who would chooee the President. He 
stated that it was "ot great importance not to make the 
government too complex" by introducing more people . Bl He 
was also afraid that the Electors would not be the states ' 
moat reputable citizens . 82 Like most ot hie fellow delegates 
Strong had an aversion to popula r elections even if they wer e 
part of an indi rect system to choose the President; however, 
he eventually did support the plan tor choosing the President. 
81Farrand, Rtco£4t , II, 100 . 
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Strong had worked for equa l representation in both 
houses of Congress based upon population . La rge states 
including Massachusetts favored this arrangement because 
the Constitution � rovided that the national goverllt1.ent 
would u•e a system ot direct taxes based upon wealth or 
population. When the i ssue divided the Convention, Strong 
accepted the Compromi•• rather than face the prospects ot 
disunion . The compromise was similar to the 3ay state • a  
a rrangement that all revenue bills would originate in the 
lower house and that the upper house could only agree or 
disagree . Strong thought that the origination ot revenue 
bills wa1 a considerable ooncession by the small s tates, 
and he accepted the report on the rep resentation of the 
Senate . He wae willing to compromise when the union was in 
jeopardy. 83 
81 8 Pa�rand, Reoo�ds , II, 7- • 
CliAPTM'.uR VI 
Ma•sachusetts was the first colony to revolt aga1nat 
British centralization, but the last state to write a 
"revolutionary" constitution . Internal unrest in weete�n 
Massachusetts caused the p ro•isional goverrnnent to agree to 
a convention to write a new constitutio n .  The conservative 
prinoiples or the new charter i-etlected the eastern commercial 
intei-eats which conti-olled the state government as they had 
the colonial governmen t .  Their control over state pol1t1�s 
was lega lized and soliditi�d by a dooument i�hieh had s divi­
sion or branches and a ayetem or checks a n d  balances . Most 
ot the governmental machinery was indi�eat so that authority 
was removed from the pressure or popular wil l .  Only the 
looal government and the lower branch of the legislature 
remained �esponsive to the pe<Jple. The state gov•rmnent was 
superior to loeal goveMUnent . When the state government 
pursued a "sound money" tiscal policy i n  the post-war 
dep ression, the western population at first strongly objeoted 
thl'ough normal goveronment channel s . But when the mercanttle­
eentered gove�nment was not responsive to the gr-ievanoes of 
the farmers , the agrarians tuiened to "illega l "  devices euoh 
aa county oonventiona and riote to force the state to accede 
to thei r demands . Yet i n  the end the rebellion waa more 
signifioant nationally than in Massachusetts . 
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How did these state e.Jq>erienoea intluenee the tour 
Ma-s-sachusetta delegat•a to suppo�t a mov.,.ent · tor constitu­
tional revision on a nati onal level? All of them were 
merchants o r  lawyeMJ who had been involved in state govern­
•ent . They also repres•nted to a minor degree the creditor 
elaes beoaus• they owne4 shares in the public debt . While 
•�u·ving in national politics , thrtee of them had obse!'Ved 
the weaknesses ot the Contederatiob, esp•cially in commercial 
and revenue p roblema . Gorham worked to str•ngtheo the centr-al 
government when he �cognized that the excessive power of the 
atatee lay at the ?toot ot the problem. Gerry and King we.re 
ooncet-ned about national p x-o·blems but not to the point of 
eacP1ficing 1tates • rights . They r•j•eted the!� state ' s  
oall in 1785 tor amending the tederal gc:>Teitnment even though 
they were working to get relief' .to r the state ' •  oommeroial 
depreseion . Shays • a  revolt ,  two years later. was thtt •motional 
ev•nt which daused th••• t'Wo men to rav�r amending the Articles . 
Appar•ntly they telt that they would not be able to pr&$erve 
their control ot the state government ag•1nst the leveling 
inf'luenoe of democsracy unless the national go'fermnent were 
a t�ngth•� · When it anea l'ed that their own state might 
not be able to tu�d its public debt, they looked to the 
oeatral government to secure the public credi t .  Both Gerry 
and King p roposed that the national governm·ent a ssume the 
state debts . Theretox-.. their motive tor constitutional 
�vision was appar•ntly not only the weltare ot theiit state 
but a lso of their personal interests and those ot their ola s s .  
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In the Conventio n ,  to what extent did state factors 
intluen�e the coostitutional ideas ot the delegates? 
Technically, if the delegates had repreaented tbeir coostit­
ueate , meaning the whole population of the atate, they would 
have been opposed to the de1truotion of atate power. The 
state constitutional r'atitication eonveotion representing 
all the towns in Ma1e1ohua•tt1 waa mostly anti -Federalist in 
its sympathies at the beginning or the meeting. The Federa lists 
in Massachusetts were made up of' the intellectual leaders and 
moat influential men in atate politics . They were able to 
convert the nominal enti•Pederali sts by ahre�d politieal 
maneuvering . First, the7 had the convention debate each 
clause of the Constitution so that Gorham, King, and Strong 
oould weaken th& op}:>oeition. Seeond, they held out a p romi se 
or the Pr-eeidency to John Hanoook to win his euppo� . Thi rd ,  
they 9tirred up the Boston mechanics t o  urge Samuel Adam• to 
tone down hia opposition to the docmnent . Finally, they 
agreed to • compromiae Ntaolution which let the oppoaition 
propose amendments •• a eondition ror ratitieatioc. 1 HoweTer 
the tour delegate• wel"e mainly interea1ied 1r:t a moN efficient, 
eentral goTernment than in l'epreeenting the total sentiment 
within theiP state . In both a general and a epeci:fic way, 
the delegation i-e�lected their knowledge or their state goverft ­
Ment . First, th• general political philosophy put forward in 
10) 
the spee ches ot the tour greatly pa ra lleled that round in 
the state ' s  oonatitutioo. The tour delegate• were in favor 
ot a separation of branches ( legislature, executive , and 
judicial ) and they resisted a ttempts to combine the executive 
and the judiciary. A lthough a l l  tour approved ot a s1ateM 
ot cheoks and balances , Gorham waa the only individual to 
support a balanoed a rrangement . King wae par tial to a 
stronge r exeeutiv• while Strong a n d  Gerry favored a stronge r 
legisla ture . On the is sue ot elections , all the delegates 
retlected their distrust ot the "evils of' demoorac7" by 
a llowing only the lower house of Congress to be chosen by 
the people .  The upper house , the exeoutive, and the judicia ry 
were to be ohoa en QJ indirect methods . Gerry and Strong wer. 
republicans and favored frequent election s ;  however, Strong 
would eomp�omise , but Gerrry refused to saorifioe his republi­
can prinoiples . More •peoirically, the extent to whioh the 
state constitution influenced the delega tea can be measured 
by the ideas which were taken directly from tba state docume nt . 
Ge rry and King propos ed that the executive have a veto, but 
that it could be oYerridden by the legiaiature . Gorham and 
Gerry p roposed that the legislature app rove the judges 
nominated by the executive . All four delegates agreed that 
revenue bi lls should originato in the lowe r  house . Gerry, 
Strong, and King at one time , all favored the nomination 
and the election of the Preaident by etate and national 
legislatu res . The re were other stillborn propoaala auch as a 
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a c ounci l or property qualifications tor otficeholding, 
whiah died on the tlooP ot the Cenvention . On the whole , 
""' 
the Ma s�aohusetts delegation wae greatly influenced by 
their state oonstitution. 
The four delegat�s wer� also influenced by their 
experiences in the Continental Congress .  Conce rnin3 the 
issue of eoll'llJ'leree , Gorham was the only member to wox-k dramat-
ioally for the prima ry interest of the state . Oer�y and 
King proposed that the national gov$ttnment assU111e and pay 
the public debt . The proposa l reflected theii- conae:rn for 
insti tuting a conservative monetary polioy which was 
practiced i n  Massachuaetts on a national level . All rour 
delega tes to the Convention beto:re the Great Compromise 
believed in representation to both houses of Cong�ess ba�ed 
upon population . The thzte� delegate� to the Continental 
Cone;raess ,  Gorham, King, a nd Gerry, had observed that one o!' 
the weaknes se� or the Con.federation was the laok o.r unani-· 
mity. Th�re.fo�e, they supported a large state pos ition 
whieh �tood against equal voting .for s ta tes since taxes 
would be levied di zteotly on population e nd/or weal th . 
Although there were many more simi la rities between 
the state and the nationa l constitutions which were never 
mentioned in Farrand'  a Reco:ttd s ,  t(ds lea ds to a seoondary 
question . Wes there a causal relationship between the 
doouments? Based upon the above &videnoe , the state 
constitution had an influence on the delegatee as 1ndiv1dUa ls,  
but not a s  a collective group . Fi rst, the Massachuse tts 
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delegates were not i n  posi tions or c reative leadership and 
did not put forward deta i led plens of government . They 
re.rely Fo�ked togethe r . They merely debated a nd cl;os e  the 
prop o s a l s  most s imila r to their i ndividua l idea s .  Go rham , 
who served a s  cru d rman o f  the C:)mmi ttee o f  the 11•'hole a nd on 
the Committee o f  Deta i l ,  p robably was in the best pos it ion to 
exe rt :::ome 1.nfluence to crea te the simi la rit i es . Seeon<l, to 
men o f  lee. rnine , the ideas of s�parstion of powers and the 
sys tem o.r checks and ba lances -were not new . The British 
syste� of colonial government �as an example a lthough Rufus 
KinB · .. · a s  the only one to mention this fact in a reference in 
a speech . John Adam s ,  who wrote the Massachusetts Constitution 
o.!' 1730 , publ1. shed a book, Defence of Cons ti tut1ons , at the 
tim e  o f  tho PhiladelpW.a Convention . James Madi son , 11the 
father of the Constitution , "  wrote that "Men or learning find 
nothi ng new in i t .  Men o f  ta ste many things to critici z e . "2 
There i s  no evidence that the Ma s sachusetts delegation was 
familiar with the book; howevo r , they may have read Adsms • s  
work, "Thought8 on Government , "  which eontained a foun dat ion 
for the state constitution of 1780 11-�hieh Gorham and Strong hnd 
� l s o  helped write . Thi rd, the Constitution of Ma s sa ohus etts 
wa � the moet :nentioned document in the convention . James 
�-I:t lson and John Randolph both ref"rred to the dooument at 
tiMe s . The Committee of Detail used all the states ' 
2Julian Boyd ( e d . ) The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
( Prine eton: Prinoeton University Pre s s , 1955), ff, 4bi-�. 
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eons ti tutions fo r their resource3 to guide thoir work, end 1 t 
c a n  be a s s umed that the I·�a ssachusett!l constitution was mT.ong 
them . 3  
In summary, the Hassachusetts constitution had a 
marked influenoe upon the federal documen t .  The similarity 
of the political philosophy or the doeuoent was a n  indication 
of the "spirit o f  the times . "  The conservative leaders of 
the day sought a governmental structure which would p rotect 
them from the "tyranny o.f the roob s 11 and the ntyranny of 
autocra cy . "  Th• Massachusetts constitution was a model 
which could meet the exigencies o f  the hou r .  The stat& 1 s  
delegation a lthough they did not plan to i n c o rporate the 
document into the na tional cons t:l tution u s 13 d  the:;.. 1� state 
exp eriences t o  ju� tify the a r rangement of the new government . 
M o s t  import a n t ,  whatever motives of the delegates were for 
changing the government , the fact remains that their 
constitutional ideas reflected their state experi ences . 
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